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SUMMARY
This thesis studies the impact of sequential auction design on participant behavior
from both a theoretical and an empirical viewpoint. In the first of the two analyses, three
sequential auction designs are characterized and compared based on expected profitability
to the participants. The optimal bid strategy is derived as well. One of the designs, the
alternating design, is a new auction design and is a blend of the other two. It assumes
that the ability to bid in or initiate an auction is given to each side of the market in an
alternating fashion to simulate seasonal markets. The conditions for an equilibrium auction
design are derived and characteristics of the equilibrium are outlined. The primary result
is that the alternating auction is a viable compromise auction design when buyers and
suppliers disagree on whether to hold a sequence of forward or reverse auctions. We also
found the value of information on future private value for a strategic supplier in a two-period
case of the alternating and reverse auction designs.
The empirical work studies the cause of low aggregation of timber supply in reverse
auctions of an online timber exchange. Unlike previous research results regarding timber
auctions, which focus on offline public auctions held by the U.S. Forest Service, we study
online private auctions between logging companies and mills. A limited survey of the
online auction data revealed that the auctions were successful less than 50% of the time.
Regression analysis is used to determine which internal and external factors to the auction
affect the aggregation of timber in an effort to determine the reason that so few auctions
succeeded. The analysis revealed that the number of bidders, the description of the good
and the volume demanded had a significant influence on the amount of timber supplied
through the online auction exchange. A plausible explanation for the low aggregation is
that the exchange was better suited to check the availability for custom cuts of timber and




Business-to-business (B2B) commerce includes several types of transactions between firms.
These transactions include purchases of material, services, technology, and financial assets.
When the labor to carry out these transactions is replaced with electronic data processing
and Internet communication, the economic transactions are referred to as B2B e-commerce.
General transactions between firms traditionally begin with a buyer searching for in-
puts or a supplier searching for buyers of its goods and services. The suppliers and buyers
may search for each other through advertising, brokers, dealers, trade shows, or industry
associations. Once a potential partner is located, some type of negotiation process begins
concerning product specifications and prices. This negotiation may conclude with either a
short-term (spot) contract or the formation of a long-term contract. After the agreement
has been made, the transaction involves ordering, billing, transportation arrangements, con-
firmation of payments and acceptance of delivery. Each of these steps toward the successful
completion of a transaction can be aided by e-commerce. Internet technologies are useful in
reducing search costs before the transaction, communication costs during the transaction,
and recording costs after the transaction (Lucking-Reiley, 2001).
A positive rate of growth is expected for electronic commerce in the business sector
with B2B e-commerce revenues expected to total $2.7 trillion by the end of 2004 (Choices,
2003). The potential market for B2B e-commerce has been estimated to reach $4.5 tril-
lion worldwide by 2005 (Goldman Sachs, 2000). In recent years, the advances in Internet
technology have allowed for increased use of Internet auctions for exchanging goods and
services between businesses. Of 294 companies surveyed in 2003, 25% participated in an
online auction during Q3, but among those, 45% increased their usage over the past quar-
ter. Large-volume purchasers were four times more likely to use auctions than their smaller
counterparts (Forrester Research, 2003).
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The expected gains in productivity have been divided into four areas: automation of
transactions, new market intermediaries, consolidation of supply and demand through orga-
nized exchanges, and changes in the extent of vertical integration (Lucking-Reiley, 2001). In
this research, we focus on market intermediaries. Some of the new market intermediaries are
auctioneers. The Internet has become a viable option for buying and selling excess inven-
tory of commodities between businesses (Keskinocak and Tayur, 2001). Some auctioneers
hold auctions of surplus inventory for suppliers (forward auctions). Other auctioneers hold
reverse auctions for buyers, in which sellers compete for a procurement contract. Reverse
auctions sponsored by large buyers are most common. In B2B transactions, the benefits of
Internet auctions can translate into large scale savings. Freemarkets, a major online pro-
curement exchange that assists firms and government agencies in designing reverse auctions,
boasts that some of its members have seen an average annual savings of over 20% in their
procurement because of their use of online reverse auctions (FreeMarkets, 2002).
Despite their popularity, as firms have begun to navigate the use of online auctions
as a new tool to aid in cost reduction across the supply chain, criticisms of the reverse
auction mechanism have arisen in industry and in academic research. Auctions typically
used for procurement of commodity goods have been used for bidding on government and
construction contracts. In the states of Minnesota and California laws were passed to
forbid the use of reverse auctions to procure government construction projects (Plumbing
& Mechanical, 2003).
In the automotive industry, suppliers formed a regulation group to create rules for the
use of reverse auctions due to buyers using the auctions unfairly. Buyers were believed to
use the auction only to see how low suppliers would bid and would not award the contract
to the lowest bidder (Automotive News, 2002). Although suppliers are taking the initiative
to create these rules, they must depend on buyer voluntary compliance because there is no
provision for enforcement.
In research conducted on the impact of reverse auctions on buyer-supplier relationships
in the automotive industry, relatively small suppliers that have participated in a single
reverse auction initiated by a large buyer with whom they had an established relationship
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expressed concerns over the buyer using the reverse auction opportunistically and forsaking
the non-price benefits by which suppliers differentiate themselves (Jap, 2003). In the study
of sequential reverse auctions, bidders have been found to self-select out of future auctions.
They also respond to repeated losses by bidding less (Garvin and Kagel, 1994).
The two works that comprise this thesis investigate an alternative to the reverse auction
and study an online exchange in which more than half of reverse auctions end without any
bidders. The studies are linked by a growing interest in how firms can effectively use the
online auction. The merging of Internet technology with the auction mechanism has lifted
previous constraints on market visibility and increased strategic possibilities for transacting
goods via an auction. This is true for firms in several industries, including the pulp and
paper industry, which is the focus of the second investigation.
Motivated by the impact of seasonal cycles on timber prices, a sequential auction is
designed in which buyers and suppliers of a commodity good can bid in or initiate auctions.
Large buyers initiate reverse auctions and small suppliers initiate forward auctions. When
the seasonal cycles are distinct and unpredictable and the demand fluctuates above forecasts,
a supplier with needed supply is able to initiate an auction. A marketplace in which both
types of auctions are exercised might have fewer concerns over fair play as both market
sides are able to take power positions of auctioneer. In addition, suppliers have an incentive
to become familiar with the technology needed to take advantage of online auctions when
in the role of auctioneer.
In the second study, we focus on understanding the cause of a lack of success with
reverse auctions in an industry exchange. In talking with industry representatives and in
reviewing websites for timber sales, it appears that less than half of auctions initiated for
timber receive one or more bids. Using a data set from an industry partner, we investigate
possible causes for the lack of participation by considering the internal and external factors




2.1 Brief Introduction to Auction Theory
2.1.1 Benchmark Auction Models
[?].There has been much research in the area of auctions. The initial research focused on
understanding and comparing the different types of auctions and determining whether one
type outperformed another in terms of efficiency and profit to the single auctioneer. (An
auction is deemed efficient if the item for auction is won by the bidder who values it most.)
The seminal work was done by Vickrey (1961), Myerson (1981), and Riley and Samuelson
(1981). They lay the framework and generalize the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, a key
paradigm of auction theory.
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem asserts the equivalence of the expected revenue to
the auctioneer regardless of which one of the following four auction forms is used. The four
basic auction models are the English auction, the Dutch auction, the first-price sealed-bid
auction, and the second-price sealed-bid auction (Vickrey auction). The English auction
is commonly used online (Jap, 2002). The auctioneer starts the bidding at a reserve price
and bidders signal their desire to pay successively higher prices verbally (open cry auction)
or otherwise. Bidders drop out once the current price exceeds their high bid and the last
remaining bidder wins the auction item and pays a price equal to the highest losing bid.
In the Dutch auction, the auctioneer starts with a high bid and decreases it until a bidder
signals a willingness to pay. That bidder wins and pays that price. In the sealed-bid auction,
bidders simultaneously submit their bids to the auctioneer knowing that the winning bidder
will pay his or her bid (first-price) or the highest losing bid (second-price).
The basic assumptions of the benchmark model (McAfee and McMillan, 1987), from
which the Revenue Equivalence Theorem is derived, are as follows:
(A1) Independent Private Values: A bidder i’s valuation vi of the object being auctioned
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is his private information and does not depend on the knowledge of other bidders.
(A2) Symmetry: Bidder i assumes that any other bidder j’s valuation is an unobserved
random variable vj , j 6= i. The valuations are drawn from the same cumulative distri-
bution F(v), vε[v, v]. The density function is f(v).
(A3) Risk Neutrality: Bidders are risk neutral, which implies that each bidder maximizes
expected return.
Some general assumptions of this model are that the seller has announced and is com-
mitted to auction rules which he or she communicates to all bidders and all bidders know
the number of other bidders, their risk neutrality, and the probability distribution of val-
uations. Based on this information, each bidder decides how to bid. Each bidder bids an
amount that is a function of his or her valuation at a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The
payment is a function of the bids alone.
This model has been thoroughly investigated over the past forty years and four inter-
esting results have been noted. The first result is that the Dutch auction is strategically
equivalent to the first-price sealed-bid auction. Each bidder will bid an amount less than
his or her true valuation. How much less depends on (i) the probability distribution of the
other bidder’s valuations and (ii) the number of competing bidders. The second result is
that the English Auction and the second-price sealed bid auction are equivalent in the sense
that they both have a unique dominant strategy equilibrium, that being to bid one’s true
valuation. At equilibrium, the winner will be the bidder who values the object most, and
the price paid will be the second highest valuation. The third result is that the winner in all
four auction forms will be the bidder who values the object the most. Hence, these auction
forms are Pareto optimal or efficient. For the English auction and the second-price sealed
bid auction, this result holds when the information structure is asymmetric as well. The
fourth result is the Revenue Equivalence Theorem mentioned previously.
McAfee and McMillan (1987) give an excellent review of the literature. Basic questions
that the early research addresses are: What is the best selling mechanism from the point of
view of the monopolist? Should the seller impose a reserve price and if so, what should that
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price be? Should the seller require payment from all bidders? What information should the
seller share with bidders about the good? These questions have been clearly answered for
the four basic types of auctions for a single auction of a unique good with a monopolistic
auctioneer.
2.1.2 Sequential Auctions
As noted previously, the English auction is the most commonly used auction type. Sub-
sequent to the study of a single English auction, researchers began to study the results of
employing them in a sequence to sell multiple goods. Some key differences between single
and multiple-period auctions are: In a sequential auction, (1) learning occurs between bid-
ders and between the bidder and the auctioneer; and (2) parameters such as the number of
bidders, their valuations, and the quality of the good may change between periods.
Klemperer (1999) provides an extensive survey of auction theory including a section
devoted to research in the area of sequential auctions. In this section, he notes that the
analysis of sequential auctions is well-developed for the special case in which no buyer wants
more than one unit. Specifically, for the auction of homogenous goods with risk neutral,
symmetric bidders with independent private values whose payment is a function of the
bids alone, revenue equivalence holds. This is true whether the goods are sold sequentially
or simultaneously (Weber, 1983; Maskin and Riley, 1989; Bulow and Klemperer, 1994).
Therefore, for a sequential auction in which those assumptions are made, the expected
revenue to the auctioneer is the same regardless of whether an English, Dutch, first-price
or second-price auction is employed. His survey does not include any work on sequential
auction designs in which the role of the auction participants may change. The first study
of this thesis contributes to this area by studying such an auction design.
Empirical verifications of the revenue equivalence result for sequential auctions have
led to research results that give insight into the price trends over the consecutive auction
rounds. Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Weber (1983) present theoretical analysis of the
price trend in a forward sequential auction of identical objects and conclude that expected
prices (expected revenue to the auctioneer) should remain the same throughout the sequence
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of auctions. However, in the case of forward auctions and because of symmetry for reverse
auctions as well, the empirical evidence shows that the actual price may either decline or
rise sequentially. During a forward auction, in which the price ascends over the course of the
auction, the evidence that the winning price in each forward auction of a sequence actually
declines is termed the ”declining price anomaly.” Much of the research on non-Internet se-
quential auctions focuses on the observance of this anomaly and its theoretical explanations.
See Ashenfelter (1989), McAfee and Vincent (1993), Von de Fehr (1994) and Menezes and
Montiero (1999) for plausible explanations. The data used in the empirical analysis of these
non-Internet sequential auctions was collected from auctions for a variety of items including
wool, stamps, condominiums, cable television licenses and wine (Menezes and Montiero,
1999). Some of these items were sold in business-to-consumer (B2C) markets while others
were sold in B2B markets. Apart from studies of price trends, this thesis contributes to the
sequential auction literature by specifically considering the English auction design in which
the roles of auction participants may change.
2.2 Internet Auctions
In the area of online auctions, much work has focused on transactions between businesses
and consumers. Researchers have conducted studies of transactions on the popular eBay
website (Lucking-Reiley et al., 2000; Bapna, Goes and Gupta, 2003). Aside from eBay,
Beam and Segev (1998) considered 100 various auction sites, 98 of which were B2C, to
identify defining characteristics of online auctions and determine the major differences from
non-Internet auctions. They cite that the online auctions are typically English auctions that
close approximately every week with the price determined by bids alone. They acknowledge
the opportunities for further research into B2B e-commerce and the empirical work in the
second study of this thesis expends the body of research in this field.
The common assumptions made in the literature on how bidders enter and exit an
auction are not typical for Internet auctions. There are many theoretical developments
that assume the clock model of the English auction as defined by Milgrom and Weber
(1982) as their basis. In this model, there are two clocks; an increasing price clock and a
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decreasing ”active-bidders” clock. Each bidder holds up a card (or presses a button or uses
some alternative device) to signal his or her willingness to buy at the current price. As the
price rises on the price clock, the number on the ”active-bidders” clock decreases as some
of the bidders lower their cards and forego, irrevocably, the possibility of buying the unit
currently on sale. If k units are for sale, the price clock stops rising when the number on
the active-bidders clock equals k. The k bidders each receive one unit at the current price
on the price clock.
Typical Internet auctions can differ from this model in that any bidder with access to
the auction web site may increase the price until the time clock runs out. The auctioneer
does not increase the price but typically, in B2B auctions, only opens the auction to an
invited group. The invited group of bidders are qualified to sell items or purchase the item
for sale. One impact of this change in the identifying assumption is that the number of
bidders in an auction is exogenously determined. Therefore, it is possible that the total
number of bidders is not known ex ante. Even when bidders are members of an exchange
and accept an invitation to bid, the number of bidders that will actually submit a bid to
buy a unit is not known until after the auction has ended (Millet et al., 2004). In the second
study, we consider a plausible explanation for auctions that end with no bidders in an online




A MODEL OF MULTI-PERIOD FORWARD AND
REVERSE AUCTIONS
3.1 Introduction
Industries with supply or demand influenced by seasonal cycles or weather conditions, such
as the pulp and paper industry (Haynes 1998) and the electricity industry (Burger 2004)
hold spot market auctions that may allow temporary shifts in auction-market roles. For
example, a supplier with excess timber to sell during a rainy, season-induced supply shortage
can potentially sell it at a premium. The wet weather that causes supply shortages in timber
gives few suppliers with excess timber the opportunity to initiate an auction in a market
where they usually act as bidders, but there is little evidence that they take advantage of this
opportunity. We compare the expected profit to the supplier and the expected surplus of
the buyer when each participates in a sequential auction as a bidder, as an auction-initiator,
or alternates between both roles. When there are numerous suppliers and few buyers, our
models characterize the equilibrium conditions under which both suppliers and buyers prefer
each auction design and under which neither market side agrees on the auction design. In
these cases, we consider a new auction design, the alternating auction, as a second option
for market equilibrium. In addition, we characterize the long term behavior of the expected
profit from each auction design as the number of periods increase. We also determine the
value to a strategic supplier of learning her future private value before the auction sequence
commences.
3.2 Background
The Internet introduces the capability of businesses to aggregate suppliers or buyers and
easily communicate their need to buy or sell excess inventory. In addition, it is much easier
for both forward and reverse auctions to exist for the same commodity because the set up
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costs for the auction-initiator have virtually been eliminated (Lucking-Reiley, 2001). Several
auction intermediaries have created websites. Many of the websites are industry specific
(e.g., ForestExpress, Covisint, and ChemConnect). These websites were created by groups
of companies interested in procuring materials through online exchanges that host auctions.
The extent to which B2B exchanges have been integrated with overall sourcing strategies
has varied significantly across industries (Berryman and Heck, 2001; Grey et al., 2002)
Capacity-intensive industries with supply or demand influenced by seasonal cycles or
weather conditions, such as the pulp and paper industry (Haynes, 1998) and the electricity
industry (Burger, 2004), use B2B exchanges to hold spot market auctions. The cyclic nature
of procurement in such industries may influence the roles of auction participants who are
able to behave strategically. We are unaware of any auction models that account for the
possibility that auction roles may change at points in time.
We study three issues in this chapter. First, we study the expected profit and surplus for
participating in sequential auctions of each type: forward, reverse, and alternating. Second,
we determine the conditions for each auction design to serve as a market equilibrium and
characterize the behavior of the equilibrium with changes in the number of periods. Third,
we determine the expected value of information on the future private value for a strategic
supplier bidding in the reverse or alternating auction design.
In Chapter 3.3, we present the auction environment for multiple periods. In Chapter
3.4, we develop the auction models and present the expected return and bid functions.
In Chapter 3.5, we develop and characterize the equilibrium auction design and conduct
further analysis. In Chapter 3.6, we summarize the results, make concluding remarks and
discuss extensions of this work.
3.3 Auction Environment
Auctions are often used when there are asymmetries of information and a monopolistic or
monopsonistic (i.e., supply-side monopoly) party. The type of auction mechanism that is
most fitting for a given market depends on the number of market participants. Forward
auctions are used primarily when there is one supplier and there are many buyers who bid the
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price up. They are typically used to sell slow-moving or excess inventory. Reverse auctions
are used primarily when there is one buyer and many suppliers who bid the price down
(Cassady, 1967). Reverse auctions are best implemented in the B2B context when there
is competition among bidders, when the purchase price of the good for auction constitutes
the largest portion of its value, and when the auctioning firm has carefully considered its
overall sourcing strategy (Jap, 2002).
For an auction assuming homogenous goods with risk neutral, symmetric bidders with
independent private values whose payment is a function of the bids alone, revenue equiva-
lence holds. This is true whether the goods are sold sequentially or simultaneously (Weber,
1983; Maskin and Riley, 1989; and Bulow and Klemperer, 1994). An auction model with
the above assumptions is referred to as the independent private values (IPV) model (Weber,
1983). For a sequential IPV auction, the expected revenue to the auctioneer is the same
regardless of whether an English, Dutch, first-price or second-price sealed-bid auction is
employed. For our purposes, we examine the sequential English auction format, which is
commonly used online (Jap, 2002).
Our auction models have three characteristics. First, we restrict our analysis to spot
market (SM) auctions, which are auctions of commodity goods that are sold for cash and
delivered immediately. Because the goods are sold for cash, they tend to be small in volume.
There is low risk involved in procuring raw materials via spot market auctions due to lower-
volume transactions of standard goods. The immediate delivery of the good indicates that
there need not be a long-term relationship between the auction participants. Spot market
auctions can occur more frequently because of the speed of the transaction and can therefore
be modeled as sequential auctions.
To model spot market auctions as sequential auctions, we assume the IPV model and
include two additional assumptions. First, we assume that the supplier and buyer valuations
change randomly each period and that neither learns her or his valuation for a period until
the beginning of that period. This change in private valuation is due to the change in
spot supply and inventory over time. In the IPV model, the bidder marginal value for
identical goods only changes as the bidder acquires multiple goods but the case of the
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bidder valuation changing with time for a single unit of a set of identical goods has not
been considered elsewhere.
Second, we assume that both buyers and suppliers of the commodity good are able to
initiate an auction at different times in a set of sequential auctions. We further assume
that any buyer has a demand equal to the number of auction periods thus desiring one unit
each period. Likewise, we assume that each supplier has a capacity constraint and is only
able to supply one unit for the duration of the sequence. Consequently, there must be more
suppliers than periods in the auction sequence.
In the literature, there has been study of forward or reverse auctions that may be first-
price in the first stage and English in the next stage. These are known as hybrid auctions
(Dutra and Menezes, 2002). There has also been study of auctions in which bidders choose
their level of participation (Levin and Smith, 1994; Menezes and Montiero, 2000). In each
of the cases studied, the bidder chooses to either enter (and bid) or not enter in each period
of a sequential auction. The choice is made based on delay or participation costs. However,
they do not have the option to initiate an auction during the periods that they do not enter
the auction to bid. We consider this option which has previously not been explored in the
literature (Klemperer, 1999).
Although the demand and supply of the buyer and supplier, respectively, will be one
unit for each auction in which they are active, the private valuation and the role of the buyer
and supplier change each period so we refer to these assumptions as period-dependent (PD).
The SM auction model that has these assumptions for the market participants and period-
dependent valuations will be referred to as a period-dependent spot market (PDSM) auction
model. Although we do not consider complementary sourcing strategies of buyers in our
models, there is work on integrating short-term spot market transactions and long-term
contracts (Araman et al., 2001; Cohen and Agrarwal, 1999; and Kleindorfer and Wu, 2003).
We compare the expected return of three sequential PDSM English auction models.
The first is a reverse auction model (RA), the second is a forward auction model (FA),
and the third combines elements of both the reverse and forward auction model (RFA). We
introduce the formal models of the multi-period auctions by summarizing their important
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features.
There are B ≥ 2 large buyers indexed j = 1...B and S ≥ 3 small suppliers indexed
i = 1...S. (For B = 1 or S ≤ 2, one or more periods of our multi-period auction would
have no competition.) At the beginning of each sequence, each buyer j has a value wjN ,
known only to buyer j, for one unit in the first auction of an N -period sequence, where
N is interpreted as the number of auctions remaining. Likewise, each supplier i has a
value viN , known only to supplier i, for one unit in the first auction of a sequence of N
auctions. Values in future periods are independent and identically distributed uniformly
with cumulative distribution F , which is assumed to have a continuous density f , and f
has support [0, 1]. The distribution of the values in each auction is known but the actual
value is private. The values in future periods change as the supply of or demand for the
spot market quantity changes independently for each market participant. For example,
current inventory decisions and future weather patterns can affect the private value timber
companies have for a given volume of timber in varying degrees.
A reverse PDSM auction is held in each period of the RA sequence and a forward PDSM
auction is held in each period of the FA sequence. For the RFA model, instead of allowing
a buyer or supplier the opportunity to initiate an auction at any time, we simplify the
model by assuming they must alternate roles. In each period of the sequence, an eligible
auctioneer (a buyer in a reverse auction period or a supplier in a forward auction period)
initiates an auction for a commodity good and invites all eligible bidders to bid while
the remaining eligible auctioneers wait for the next period in the sequence to participate.
All eligible auctioneers have an equal likelihood of acting as the auctioneer. Before the
auction begins, all eligible bidders (buyers in a forward auction period or suppliers in a
reverse auction period) discover their private valuations and submit a bid bN in the N th-to-
last period of the sequence. Their private valuations depend on seasonal patterns, current
inventory, and the transportation costs to deliver the good to the auctioneer. After a winner
is determined (based on the highest bid in a forward auction or the lowest bid in a reverse
auction), one supplier exits due to supply constraints. Whether a supplier sells the good as
an auctioneer or, as a bidder, wins the right to sell it, she exits the auction sequence after
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participating in one transaction. Buyers do not exit the auction sequence because they
have an unlimited capacity for the small volume that is transacted in the spot market. To
analyze the alternating auction model, we fix the last period as a forward auction.
In the PDSM marketplace, with large buyers and small suppliers, the supplier is able
to initiate an auction when there is a season-induced supply shortage and the supplier has
excess supply to sell. For simplification of the model, we assume that only one random
supplier has excess supply to sell. Buyers submit bids in a forward auction because they
have constant output requirements, seasonal conditions reduce their input levels, and the
operational risk is low when purchasing small volumes. Each buyer is one of the buyers to
which all suppliers supply the commodity good.
The buyer’s surplus is defined as the difference between the amount that a buyer has
budgeted to pay for the good and the amount he actually pays. The supplier’s profit is
defined as the difference between the amount that the good costs the supplier and the
amount for which she sells it. (For convenience, we use male pronouns to represent buyers
and female pronouns to represent suppliers.) We assume the inventory cost for the good
is negligible compared to the price of the good. Both forward and reverse auctions are
assumed to be English auctions. The payment made by the buyer who initiates the auction
and received by the winning supplier is equal to the second lowest bid across suppliers.
Likewise, when the supplier initiates, the payment made by the winning buyer is equal to
the second highest bid across buyers.
We next develop each auction model and determine the optimal bidding strategies. We
prove each strategy’s optimality and expected profit by mathematical induction. All proofs
can be found in Appendix A.
3.4 Auction Models
In this chapter, we compare the expected profit and surplus for PDSM auction sequences
of N reverse auctions, N forward auctions, and N alternating auctions. The comparison is




In the sequential second-price reverse auction, the bidders have the dominant strategy to
bid their true valuation in the last period (Milgrom and Weber, 2000). There is a bidding
function, bN , which is the pure strategy symmetric equilibrium in the first period of a
sequence having N periods. The assumption of bidder symmetry in the IPV model allows
us to fix a supplier i and remove the superscript of the private valuation. As each auction
ends, the value of N decrements by one and both the bid strategy and the valuation change
with each new period. As the number of remaining periods N decreases, a supplier’s bid
strategy will change. In general, we define a supplier’s bid strategy in the N th-to-last
period as bN (vN ), where vN is the supplier’s value of the good being auctioned in the N th-
to-last period. Although the function bN is a function of several variables, we highlight
its dependence on the private valuation because that is the variable that is private to the
bidder and may or may not be reported as the bidder’s true type for strategic purposes.
(Note that by our assumption, vN is unknown until the N th-to-last period begins; therefore,
we use the value distribution f defined previously in our expected profit calculations.)
The set of the bid functions for the supplier reveals that her optimal bid strategy is to
inflate her bid while the set of bid functions for the buyer reveals that his optimal strategy
is to bid his valuation. Because the bidders are symmetric, these are the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium bid functions.
Proposition 3.4.1 (RA Expected Supplier Profit and Bid Strategy)The optimal equilibrium
bid function when competing in the N th-to-last period of a PDSM reverse auction with S
suppliers is
bN = vN +
N − 1
S(S −N + 1) .
Proof: See Appendix A.
The expected profit to a supplier competing in the N th-to-last period of a PDSM reverse
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S(S −N + 1) . (1)
As in (1), the first term of the expected profit can be split into 1−vNS (1− vN )S−1, which is
a part of the profit to the winning supplier with valuation vN multiplied by the probability
that vN is less than the lowest valuation of the remaining S− 1 suppliers. The second term
N−1
S(S−N+1) is the amount by which the bidder with the next lowest valuation inflates her
bid according to the optimal bid strategy. It is the sum of the expected profit of winning
a future reverse auction and can be expanded to 1S(S−1) +
1
(S−1)(S−2) + ... +
1
(S−N)(S−N+1) .
This term is the other part of the profit to the winning supplier. The expected profit
for an arbitrary supplier is composed of these two parts of profit to the winning supplier
and explained further in Appendix A. Because the number of remaining periods is N , the
number of suppliers, S > N .
The bid function is the private valuation of the bidder in the first period of an N -period
auction sequence inflated by a function of the number on suppliers, buyers, and periods.
Because the bidders are symmetric, this is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid function.
3.4.1.2 Alternating Auction
We now turn to the alternating auction model for comparison. When the number of periods
is even, the RFA model begins with a reverse auction. In the following proposition, we see
that the RFA model of alternating auctions resembles the RA model when there is an even
number of periods.
Proposition 3.4.2 (RFA Expected Supplier Profit and Bid Strategy)The expected profit to





























The optimal bid strategy is
bN (vN ) = vN +
B − 3
2(B + 1)(S − 1) + ∆N .
where ∆N , N > 2, is the expected profit in subsequent auctions.
Proof: See Appendix A.
When we compare the expected profit functions in (1) and (2) we notice that the first
terms are identical but the remaining terms differ considerably. The future expected profit
of the alternating auction that has an even number of periods is comprised of the probability
of not being selected to initiate in prior period, the probability of being selected to initiate
in an upcoming forward auction, and the expected profit of winning a future reverse auction
given that the supplier doesn’t know her future private valuations. A detailed interpretation
of this proposition is as follows.
The first term, (1−vN )
S
S is the expected profit of the reverse auction in the N
th-to-last








the probability that the supplier is able to initiate a forward auction. The term B−1B+1 is
the expected price of a forward English auction when valuations are uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1. The term 12 is the expected future private valuation of the supplier. The
sum-product term has three parts. The product term is the probability that the supplier
is not able to initiate in any of the first p periods. The term 1(S−2p)(S−2p+1) is the expected
profit to the supplier who wins a reverse auction. This term is identical to the pattern
of the future expected profit of a reverse auction in the RA model. The last part of the
sum-product term is the expected profit if the supplier is able to initiate a forward auction
after 2p + 1 periods have passed.
3.4.1.3 Forward Auction Model
We now turn to the forward auction sequence. In the FA model buyers compete to win
excess supply from the supplier.
Proposition 3.4.3 (FA Expected Supplier Profit) The expected profit to a supplier in the


















S − p− 1 . (3)
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Proof: See Appendix A.




S is the expected profit
from winning in the first period. The sum-product term is the future expected profit if the
supplier is not able to host the forward auction in the first p periods but is able to host an
auction in one of the remaining periods.
3.4.1.4 Alternating Auction
We now turn to the alternating auction model for comparison. When the number of periods
is odd, the RFA model begins with a forward auction. In the following proposition, we see
that the RFA model of alternating auctions resembles the FA model when there is an even
number of periods.
Proposition 3.4.4 (RFA Expected Supplier Profit and Bid Strategy) The expected profit
























S − 2p− 2

.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note that ΥN is the future expected profit.
The first term of both (3) and (4) are identical. The sum-product term is identical
to that of (2) except that it accounts for an odd value of N . It is the probability of not
being able to initiate a forward auction and the profit that the supplier receives from either
initiating a future forward auction or winning a reverse auction.
3.4.2 Buyer’s Perspective
In this chapter, we compare the expected surplus to the buyer in the reverse, forward, and
alternating auction models. The expected surplus to a buyer participating in the N th-to-last
auction period will be denoted by the function, DN .
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3.4.2.1 Reverse Auction
Proposition 3.4.5 (RA Expected Buyer Surplus) The expected surplus to a buyer in the
















, if N = 1.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The total expected profit has two parts. The first term,
wN− 2S+1
B , is the expected surplus
from being able to initiate in the N th-to-last period. It is the difference between the buyer’s
valuation and the winning bid price, which is the average expected price of a reverse auction
when the bidder valuations are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. When there is only
one period, the summation term is not applicable. Because we assume that the buyer can
host more than one reverse auction, the second term is the expected profit if the buyer is
able to win one or more subsequent periods when his future valuations are unknown.
3.4.2.2 Alternating Auction
Proposition 3.4.6 (RFA Expected Buyer Surplus and Bid Strategy) The expected surplus



















The optimal bid function of the competing buyer is
bN (wN ) = wN .
Proof: See Appendix A.
A comparison of the expected surplus functions in (5) and (6) shows that the first terms
are identical. In the second term of (6), N2 represents the half of the N auctions that will
be forward auctions, in which the buyer bids. The fraction 1B(B+1) is the future expected
surplus of the buyer who wins in the reverse auctions given that he does not know his
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future private valuations. The second term of (5) and the third term of (6) are similar and
account for the remaining reverse auctions that the buyer may be able to initiate given that
his future private valuations are unknown. When N = 2, the third term in (6) equals zero
(because there are no other reverse auctions in the sequence).
3.4.2.3 Forward Auction
Proposition 3.4.7 (FA Expected Buyer Surplus and Bid Strategy) The expected surplus to








and the optimal equilibrium bid strategy is
bN (wN ) = wN .
Proof: See Appendix A.
The first term, w
B
N
B , is the expected surplus from winning in the first period. It can be
broken into two parts. The first part, wNB , is the profit to a buyer with valuation wN . The
second part, wB−1N , is the probability that the highest valuation of the other B − 1 buyers
is less than wN . The second term, N−1B(B+1) , is the sum of the expected surplus from winning
N − 1 forward auctions.
The equation for the optimal equilibrium bid function, bN , states that the buyer’s op-
timal bid strategy is to bid his true valuation for the good in each period. The intuition
is that we assume that each buyer is able to transact in each period, so each auction that
passes without a buyer winning is one less good out of N that the buyer is not able to
purchase. In other words, there is no opportunity cost for winning in the current period
instead of in a future period. The buyer has virtually no limit for spot market inventory
and is able to win each auction. Hence the buyer will bid truthfully to acquire as many of
the N goods as possible.
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3.4.2.4 Alternating Auction
Proposition 3.4.8 (RFA Expected Buyer Surplus and Bid Strategy) The expected surplus
to a buyer in the N th-to-last period of a PDSM alternating sequence when N is odd is
















and bN (wN ) = wN .
Proof: See Appendix A.
The first term of (8) is identical to the first term of (7). The second terms are similar
but the second term in (7) represents the expected surplus in only half of the remaining
auctions thus requiring the third term in (7) to account for the expected surplus from future
reverse auctions.
We note that the optimal bid strategy for each supplier bidding in a PDSM auction
with N > 1 is to inflate her bid above her private valuation. The optimal bid strategy of
the buyer is to bid his valuation in each period.
3.5 Analysis
We compare the performance of the alternating auction design to that of the reverse and
forward auction designs. First, we derive the conditions under which each auction design is
an equilibrium and when neither the reverse nor forward is an equilibrium. We then look
at whether for these instances, the alternating auction design is a next best alternative. We
also find the conditions under which the preferences of auction design change with changes
in the number of suppliers, buyers and periods in a test range. Second, we look at how the
expected profit and surplus functions change with a local increase in the number of periods.
Lastly, because we assume that the private valuations change randomly each period, we
will measure how much a strategic supplier should pay to learn her private value in the last
period of a two-period sequence both before and after learning her private valuation in the
first period.
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3.5.1 Equilibrium Auction Design
To determine the equilibrium auction design, we compare the expected return from each
auction design. For each side of the market, the comparison is expressed by inequalities.
Three inequalities are needed to characterize the preference of each market side among the
three auction designs. Each inequality is stated with respect to the number of buyers, B.
When the number of buyers is above the expression, one auction design is preferred. When
it is below the expression, the other design is preferred. An equilibrium auction design, if
one exists, is the design that both suppliers and buyers prefer when B is within a given
range.
Before the decision on the auction type between buyer and supplier is made, the private
valuation is not known to either buyer or supplier. This is because a portion of the valuation
of either party depends on the transportation or delivery cost of the good and therefore
depends on who will initiate the auction. To account for this we integrate the expected
profit and surplus functions with respect to the private valuations of the suppliers and
buyers, respectively. These valuations are uniformly distributed between zero and one. The
derivation of the inequalities is located in Appendix B.
Buyer Preference
In this section, we compare the N -period expected surplus to the buyer under each auction
sequence.
Proposition 3.5.1 (Buyer Reverse Auction vs. Forward Auction) A surplus-maximizing






Under the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and N ≥ 2, when S ≥ 5 or both S ≥ 4
and N = 2, the buyer will prefer the reverse auction if and only if B > Nλ − 1 . When
S = N + 1 for N ∈ {2, 3}, the buyer will never prefer the reverse auction (because no B
exists for which B < Nλ − 1).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 3.5.2 (Buyer Reverse Auction vs. Alternating Auction) A surplus-maximizing
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buyer will be indifferent between a sequence of reverse auctions and a sequence of alternating






















2 − 2S−2p , when N is odd.
Under the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and N ≥ 2, when S ≥ 6 or when
both S = 5 and N = 2 or N = 3, the buyer will prefer the reverse auction if and only if
B > N2(λ−ρ) − 1 . When S = N + 1 for N ∈ {2, 3, 4}, the buyer will never prefer the reverse
auction (because no B exists for which B < N2(λ−ρ) − 1). When S = 4 and N = 2 (the only
remaining case), the buyer again will never prefer the reverse auction.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 3.5.3 (Buyer Forward Auction vs. Alternating Auction) A surplus-maximizing
buyer will be indifferent between a sequence of forward auctions and a sequence of alternat-
ing auctions when B = N2∗ρ − 1
where ρ is as defined in Proposition 3.5.3.
Under the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and N ≥ 2, when S ≥ 5 or when both
S = 4 and N = 2, the buyer will prefer the forward auction if and only if B < N2ρ − 1.
When S = N + 1 for N ∈ {2, 3}, the buyer will prefer the forward auction because for any
B, N2(B+1) > ρ.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Supplier Preference
In this section, we compare the N -period expected profit to the supplier under each auction
sequence.
Proposition 3.5.4 (Supplier Reverse Auction vs. Forward Auction) A profit-maximizing

















S − q ))
1
S − p− 1 ,
Under the standard assumptions that S ≥ N +1 and N ≥ 2, we have that the buyer will
prefer the reverse auction to the forward auction if and only if B > 1+γ1−γ .
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 3.5.5 (Supplier Reverse Auction vs. Alternating Auction) A profit-maximizing







S(S−N+1)(S − 1)− κ(S − 1) + 12 + 12τ(S − 1)















q=0(1− 1S−2q )) 1S−2p−2 , when N is odd















q=0(1− 1S−2q )) 1(S−2p)(S−2p−1) , when N is odd
0, when N = 2.
Under the standard assumptions that S ≥ N +1 and N ≥ 2, the buyer will prefer the reverse
auction to the alternating auction if and only if B > 1+%1−% .
Proof: See Appendix B.
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Table 1: Conditions for Forward and Reverse Auctions as Equilibrium Auction Preference
Player Reverse Forward
Supplier B > 1+γ1−γ : RA > FA B <
1+γ
1−γ : FA > RA
Supplier B > 1+%1−% : RA > RFA B >
1+η
1−η : FA > RFA
Buyer B > Nλ − 1 : RA > FA B < N2ρ − 1 : FA > RFA
Buyer B > N2(λ−ρ) − 1 : RA > RFA B < Nλ − 1 : FA > RA
Table 2: Conditions for Alternating Auction as Equilibrium Auction Preference
Player Alternating
Supplier B < 1+%1−% : RFA > RA
Supplier B < 1+η1−η : RFA > FA
Buyer B > N2ρ − 1 : RFA > FA
Buyer B < N2(λ−ρ) − 1 : RFA > RA
Proposition 3.5.6 (Supplier Forward Auction vs. Alternating Auction) A profit-maximizing







S+1 + 2κS(S − 1)
(α− τ)S(S − 1)− 1 + 1,
where α, κ and τ are as defined in Propositions 3.5.4 and 3.5.5.
Under the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and N ≥ 2, the supplier will prefer the
forward auction to the alternating auction if and only if B > 1+η1−η .
Proof: See Appendix B.
The conditions that must be satisfied to yield an equilibrium auction preference are in
Tables 1 and 2. When the inequalities under the column heading ’Reverse’ hold, the reverse
auction (RA) is the equilibrium auction design. Likewise, when the inequalities under the
headings ’Forward’ and ’Alternating’ hold the forward (FA) and alternating (RFA) auction
designs are the equilibrium, respectively.
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Table 3: Conditions when Alternating Auction is a Compromise
Supplier Buyer
RA>RFA>FA FA>RFA>RA
B > 1+%1−% B <
N
2ρ − 1




B < 1+%1−% B >
N
2ρ − 1
B > 1+η1−η B >
N
2(λ−ρ)
When neither the reverse nor the forward auction is an equilibrium, we consider the
second choice of suppliers and buyers. If, for example, one side of the market prefers RA
and the other prefers FA, it might be that RFA is an acceptable ”compromise” as the
second choice of each. In other words, we look to see whether Min(RA, FA) < RFA <
Max(RA, FA) for both sides of the market.
To determine if the space where these inequalities hold is nonempty, we consider the space
of up to twenty suppliers and twenty periods. We replace the inequalities with equalities
and the resulting equations give the number of buyers that would make each side indifferent
between two given auction designs. When plotted in a three-dimensional space, the equation
corresponds to an indifference surface with a unique value of B for each (N,S) pair. This
surface illustrates a preference between two auction designs as the number of suppliers and
the number of periods change. For values of B above the surface, one auction design is
preferred while for values of B below the surface, the second of the two auction designs is
preferred.
The indifference surfaces are displayed in Figures 14-16 and 19-21 of Appendix C. The
graphs have asymptotes along the diagonal where the values of S and N approach one
another. These asymptotes are a graphical default. The diagonal separates valid auctions
(those with S > N) from invalid auctions (those with S ≤ N). The surfaces oscillate as the
number of periods change due to the stepwise nature of the functions. The corresponding
values of B for the first twenty periods when there are less than 20 or fewer suppliers are
displayed in the tables in Figures 36, 37, and ??. These tables aide in understanding the
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behavior of the indifference surfaces when the number of suppliers is from 3 to 20 and the
number of periods is from 2 to 20. The naming of the surface SRARFA, for example, refers
to the surface for which the supplier is indifferent between the reverse auction(RA) and
the alternating auction (RFA). Because we set the inequality to an equality, the value of
SRARFA is the number of buyers participating in the exchange at which the supplier or
buyer is indifferent between the two auction designs.
There are numerous intersections between buyer and supplier indifference surfaces for
low values of S and N due to the relatively large fluctuations in the expected profit and
surplus when N is small. The introduction of the sum and sum-product term into the
expected profit and surplus functions as N = 3 and N = 4 affect these fluctuations in
accordance with Propositions 3.4.2-3.4.6 and 3.4.8. The greatest fluctuations are on the
side of the buyer and are outlined in the cases of Propositions 3.5.1-3.5.3. Prior to the
introduction of the sum and sum product term, the alternating and conventional auction
models are the same. As N continues to increase, the contribution of each additional period
(as shown in Appendix D) is small relative to this initial introduction of the sum and sum-
product terms. This allows both the supplier and buyer indifference surfaces to remain
in their respective regions in the test range. The long-term behavior of the indifference
surfaces is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Indifference Surfaces for up to 50 Periods
Observation 1 For N < 50, from the perspective of the supplier, the indifference
surfaces remain between 3 and 5 buyers. The indifference surfaces for the buyer remain
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between 1 and 3 buyers. We observe that as N increases, the supplier and buyer indiffer-
ence surfaces separate while the indifference surfaces that correspond to each market side
become closer. The space between the surfaces corresponds to the region where neither the
forward nor reverse auction serves as an equilibrium and where the alternating auction is
a compromise. This space contains the integer value of three buyers (B = 3) for N > 7.
Therefore, the space is non-empty for N > 7. The number of buyers B is an integer value
within the region where RFA is a compromise. In this region neither RA nor FA was an
equilibrium and RFA was a second choice for both sides of the market. This indicates that
in expectation, the RA or FA model will be most likely an equilibrium outside of this region
(i.e., B < 3 or B > 3).
A primary observation is that the presence of 3 buyers is a turning point for the supplier
in equilibrium auction preference. This is because the expected price in the auction is the
second highest bid, which is B−1B+1 . When B = 3, this term equals
1
2 . Because the bids can
range from zero to one and the expected valuation is 12 , the forward auction is only profitable
for the supplier when the number of buyers is greater than three. When suppliers know
their valuation before they choose the auction design, if B > 1+v1−v , suppliers prefer to initiate
a forward auction. On the other hand, when there are three or fewer buyers, suppliers and
buyers prefer the RA auction type. This is because when the number of buyers is three or
less, the suppliers are more susceptible to a negative profit in employing a FA. In this case
the supplier prefers to bid in a RA, which guarantees the supplier a non-negative profit.
3.5.1.1 Additional Observations of Preferences
We illustrate the trend of the indifference surfaces when N is greater than seven periods
within our twenty-period space. We chose to illustrate the trend for seven to twenty periods
because the proofs from Propositions 3.5.1-3.5.6 give that the preferences of suppliers and
buyers do not switch after N > 7. In addition, the tables and graphs in Appendix C show
that the supplier indifference surfaces do not intersect the buyer indifference surfaces for N
greater than seven within this space.
Observation 2 The indifference surfaces for the supplier cross as the number of periods
28
change from even to odd in the test range.
The tables in Figures 17 and 18 of Appendix C show how the indifference surface
SFARFA crosses the other two surfaces, SRAFA and SRARFA, as the number of periods
change from even to odd. The negative numbers that are above the diagonal correspond to
regions of intersection. The tables give the difference between the values of B that make
the supplier indifferent for each pair of auction designs. Therefore, the change in this differ-
ence from positive to negative or vice versa indicates an intersection between indifference
surfaces. The negative values have been highlighted to indicate an intersection as either the
value of S or N change. Because the change occurs at integer points the the preference at
those points will be the dominant preference when all three surfaces are compared.
Observation 3 For the buyer, the BRARFA and BFARFA indifference surfaces also
cross each other as the number of periods change from even to odd but neither crosses the
BRAFA indifference surface in the test range.
The tables in Figures 22 and 23 of Appendix C demonstrate this as the number of
periods change from even to odd.
When we consider the tables in Figures 31-35 in Appendix C we see that the buyer and
supplier indifference surfaces all intersect within the first six periods and (except for the
BFARFA surface) when the number of suppliers is less than twelve. The BFARFA surface
is above the SRAFA and SRARFA surfaces when there are four periods even when the
number of suppliers is above twelve. The result of the intersections is a change in equilibrium
preferences. For example, if we compare the table values when there are two periods and
five suppliers, the buyer indifference surfaces, RA/RFA and RA/FA, which tend to stay
below the supplier indifference surfaces, are both above all supplier indifference surfaces
and the buyer FA/RFA indifference surface. This affects the combined market equilibrium.
Observation 4 The indifference surfaces in the test range reach asymptotes along the
diagonal of each surface as the values of S and N approach one another.
The differences in the expected return with an increase in the number of periods are in
Appendix D. From the differences, we see that when the number of periods and the number
of suppliers are close in value, the contribution of an additional period to the expected
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return is greater.
Observation 5 The expected return from the alternating auction is non-negative in
the test range for B = 3.
The tables in Figure 2 show the expected profit and surplus when B = 3 in the test
range. This expected profit is non-negative for both sides of the market. The expected
profit decreases for the supplier while the expected surplus increases for the buyer as the
number of suppliers increases. This is because there is an increase in the competition
between suppliers. We conclude the following
Proposition 3.5.7 (Equilibrium Auction Design) The conditions for each auction design
to be an equilibrium auction design for the N -period PDSM market are as listed in Table 1.
When neither the reverse nor the forward auction design is an equilibrium, the alternating
auction can serve as a profitable next best option and alternative to not conducting an
auction at all.
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Figure 2: Indifference Surfaces for up to 50 Periods
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3.5.2 Comparative Statics
We are also interested in the effect of a local increase in the number of periods on the
expected profit and surplus. For example, how valuable is it to an auctioneer to extend the
number of periods by one? The answer to this question will help the auctioneer determine
how many periods to include in the auction considering any fees, advertising, or opportunity
costs involved in holding an auction. For example, an auctioneer could extend the number of
periods in the sequence until the increase in the expected profit or surplus from an additional
period becomes less than the variable or opportunity costs of conducting an auction in that
period.
The amount of increase in expected profit or surplus can be determined by taking the
difference in the expected return (i.e., PN+1 − PN ). This gives the contribution of the
addition period to the expected profit or surplus. This analysis for the reverse, forward and
alternating cases is in Appendix D.
We found that the expected profit to a supplier from a reverse auction increases with
an increase in the number of periods. The expected profit to a supplier from a forward
auction decreases with an increase in the number of periods when B = 2. This is because
when there are only two buyers, the expected winning price of each auction is less than
the supplier’s expected private valuation. The expected profit to a supplier from a forward
auction is non-decreasing when B ≥ 3. The expected profit to a supplier from an additional
period in an alternating auction design increases when B ≥ 3 and is non-increasing when
B = 2.
For the buyer, the expected surplus from a reverse auction increases with an increase
in the number of periods as long as the difference between the number of suppliers and
period is greater than three. After this point, it is non-increasing. The expected surplus to
the buyer from a forward auction increases with an increase in the number of periods. The
expected surplus to the buyer from an increase in the number of periods in an alternating
auction increases when the inequality B+22(B+1) >
2S−2N+4+B
(S−N+1)(S−N+2) holds, when otherwise it is
non-increasing. Specifically, when B + 2 > (S −N + 1)(S −N), an increase in N decreases
the expected surplus.
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Table 4: Model Comparison - Change in Expected Return With an Increase in the Number
of Periods
Models Supplier Buyer
RA ↑ ↑ ∗
FA ↔, ↑** ↑
RFA ↑*** ↓****
*when S −N > 3; otherwise it’s non-increasing
**when B ≥ 3; otherwise it’s decreasing
***when B ≥ 3; otherwise it’s non-increasing
****when B+22(B+1) >
2S−2N+4+B
(S−N+1)(S−N+2) ; otherwise it’s decreasing
Therefore, when (S − N) ≤ 3, there exists an upper bound on the number of periods
that both buyers and supplier prefer the RA model. When B = 2, there is an upper bound
on the number of periods that both buyers and supplier prefer for the FA model. For the
RFA model, an upper bound exists when B = 2 and S − N ≥ 3 and when B ≥ 3 and
S − N = 1. In the cases that an upper bound does not exist, as S and N approach one
another the bound is formed. The values of S, B, and N determine when an upper bound
exists. A summary of the rate of an increase in the number of periods on the expected
profit and surplus is in Table 4.
We conclude the following
Proposition 3.5.8 (Preference of Sequence Length) The effect of increasing the number of
auction periods is shown in Table 4.
Proof: See Appendix D.
3.5.3 Expected Value of Information
In this chapter, we determine the expected value of learning the future valuation for the
supplier. One of the primary assumptions of the PDSM model is that the private valuations
change each period. Given the uncertainty of private valuations in the future, we are
interested in how much a supplier would be willing to pay to learn her future private
valuation. This is important for the supplier because her bid strategy includes her expected
future profits. Eliminating the uncertainty in the future, can help the supplier behave
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strategically across periods. We consider the expected profit to the strategic supplier after
she has chosen to participate in a two-period auction type for two cases. We calculate the
expected value of the option to learn the private valuation in the last period both before
and after learning the valuation in the 2nd-to-last period for each auction model.
As we showed in Chapter 3.4, for the PDSM FA and RFA models, the bid strategy for
the buyers is to bid truthfully in every period. Therefore, knowledge about future valuations
will not affect the expected surplus to the buyer. However, the bid function for the suppliers
in the PDSM RA and RFA models equals the private valuation inflated by a function of S
,B and N .
Let v2 and v1 be the valuation in the 2nd-to-last and last period, respectively. To
determine the expected value to a supplier of knowing her second period valuation at the
beginning of the 2nd-to-last period auction given that she has already chosen to participate
in a two-period auction of a specific type, we determine the difference of the expected profit
when v1 is known and unknown for the reverse and alternating model because it is in these
models that the supplier can behave strategically.
We then determine the expected profit from each outcome of perfect information by
integrating over the range of values of v1 and v2 that produce each outcome when both
v1 and v2 are known. When v1 is not known, we fix v1 and determine the expected profit
from each outcome of perfect information. To determine the expected value to a supplier of
learning what her private valuation will be in the last period after she has discovered what
her valuation is in the 2nd-to-last period, we integrate over the values of v1. To determine
the expected value to the supplier of learning what her private valuation will be in the last
period before discovering her valuation in the 2nd-to-last period, we integrate over both v1
and v2 respective to each outcome of perfect information.
To determine the expected value to a supplier of learning the value of v1 both before and
after learning the value of v2, we sum the conditional expected profit from each outcome of
perfect information and subtract the expected profit when v1 is unknown.
Proposition 3.5.9 (Expected Value of Information) For the reverse auction, the expected
value to the supplier of knowing her valuation in the last period after choosing to participate
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in a two-period auction after (EV IA) and before (EV IB) learning her valuation in the 2nd-
to-last period are as follows:
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For the alternating auction, the expected value to the supplier of knowing her valuation
in the last period after choosing to participate in a two-period auction after (EV IA) and
before (EV IB) learning her valuation in the 2nd-to-last period are as follows:
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Proof: See Appendix E.
Given the expected value of information equations, a supplier can determine if it is
worth knowing her future valuation for different values of S and B. Because it is possible
for the supplier who initiates a forward auction to receive a negative profit, she would prefer
to bid accordingly in the first auction of the alternating sequence to maximize her expected
profit.
When the RA model is used, the bid of the supplier in the 2nd-to-last period depends on
her private valuation in the last period. If the supplier loses the 2nd-to-last period auction,
she will bid truthfully in the last period. In the combined reverse and forward auctions,
the supplier will bid according to the expected profit in the last period. In this respect, the
RFA model and RA model are similar. In the RFA model the expected winning bid price in
the last period is the same regardless of the supplier who initiates but the expected profit
depends on a supplier’s private valuations if she uses the option to learn it beforehand. If
37
she learns her valuation before hand and finds that there will be a negative expected profit
in the last period, this will affect the bid placed in the 2nd-to-last period. The bid in the
2nd-to-last period will likely be more aggressive to avoid a future loss.
If suppliers initiate a forward auction, before knowing their future private valuation,
they may have a positive expected profit going into the sequential auction and later regret
their decision since they cannot enforce a reservation price above their cost. This could be
a costly mistake for firms who are new to auctions to suffer because they may later find
that they cannot enforce their reservation price.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we characterized the expected return and bid strategy of a market partic-
ipant in three models of sequential auctions. We developed a new hybrid auction model
(RFA) and compared its expected return to that of two conventional models (RA and FA).
The hybrid and conventional models of expected return are similar when there are only a
few (one or two) periods in the sequence.
We generalized the auction models to provide an N -period formulation of the optimal bid
strategy. The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is for each bidder to bid according to an optimal
bid strategy. In our models, the bid strategy for the buyer is to bid his private valuation.
The bid strategy for the supplier is to inflate her bid above her private valuation. The
amount of the inflation depends on the sequential auction design and auction parameters.
We defined the conditions under which each auction design is an equilibrium. We also
defined the conditions under which neither the reverse nor the forward auction design is
an equilibrium. When neither is an equilibrium, we found where the alternating auction
is a second choice within a sample region. In the sample region, the alternating auction
produced positive return and was therefore better than holding no auction at all.
We further investigated these equilibrium conditions using a subset of values for the
number of suppliers and auction periods in the sequence. In doing so, we observed that the
indifference surfaces for buyers and suppliers intersect when the number of periods is small
(seven periods or less) but a distinct difference between buyer and supplier indifference
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surfaces becomes apparent as the number of periods increase. We also observed that both
the indifference surfaces of a supplier intersect as the number of periods change from even
to odd and vice versa. Only two of the three buyer indifference surfaces intersect as the
periods change. As the number of periods increase, the indifference surfaces for suppliers
and buyers are above and below a value of three for B, respectively. In addition, the space
where the alternating auction is a compromise is non-empty.
We used the difference in the expected return between periods to determine the effect
of increasing the number of periods on the expected supplier profit and buyer surplus. We
found the conditions under which the expected return to a supplier and buyer change with
an increase in the number of periods. The presence of three buyers tends to affect the
expected return in auction designs in addition to the number of periods. We also found the
bounds on the length of the auction sequence under each auction design.
We also determined the expected value of knowing the private valuation in the last
period of a two-period sequence after a commitment to an auction design has been made.
Because suppliers are subject to a negative expected profit when participating in a forward
PDSM auction, it is likely in their best interest to learn their future private valuation. It is
important that they know how much they should pay for that information.
Some extensions of this work involve relaxing the assumption that the sequences alter-
nate and searching for properties of an equilibrium participation strategy when any supplier
or buyer desires to initiate in any period. When a supplier initiates an auction, her private
valuation influences how profitable the auction will be. In the models, we assume that the
future valuations are random. However, if the supplier learns her future valuations at the
beginning of the sequence, she may not want to initiate a forward auction. In this case, the
option to initiate an auction or bid will follow a mixed strategy in equilibrium. It would also
be useful to include alternating sequences in the larger picture of a total sourcing policy.
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CHAPTER IV
KEY FACTORS IN SUCCESSFUL TIMBER
PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
We analyzed data from reverse auctions for timber procurement on the spot market and
found less than half of the auctions that were initiated attracted one or more bidders.
Because aggregating volume is a primary goal of auctioneers for using the auction, we look
for plausible explanations using factors that tend to affect supply. We look at the effect
of factors that are internal and external to the auction to determine their influence on the
supply of timber transacted in the online spot market. We found that the number of bidders
had the largest independent influence on the amount of supply transacted on the exchange.
We also found a seasonal effect on the amount supplied but no incentive for suppliers to
withhold supply for price benefits.
4.1 Literature Review
Timber has been the highest valued crop in 8 Southern states and it has ranked among the
top three agriculture crops in all of the 13 Southern states (USDA, 1988). The US is the
largest producer of industrial roundwood in the world, almost double any other country.
This is true despite the fact that is has only 6% of the world’s forest area. The South’s part
in this is substantial. It produces about 55% of the total US harvest and has about one-half
the total industrial forest plantations in the world (Cubbage et al., 1998). The supply chain
for the pulp and paper industry differs in the South and Pacific-Northwest, which are the
main U.S. forest locations.
About 70% of all paper is produced in integrated pulp and paper mills, which turn
timber into pulp and then into paper. Recycled fiber is gaining popularity as a substitute
input for timber at pulp and paper mills. Due to government mandates and environmental
regulations in the early 1990’s, much of the recently built pulping capacity uses waste paper
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instead of virgin wood fiber (Hillstrom, 1994). The share of recycled paper used by paper
mills in the US is projected to increase from 25% in 1998 to 36% by the year 2040 while
timber, also known as roundwood, consumption decreases from 50% to 30% (Skog et al.,
1999). The balance includes fiber from mill residue and imported woodpulp. The amount
of imported woodpulp is comparatively small at roughly 6% but may increase to as much as
21% by 2040. The process for using each type of input differs and most mills were designed
with timber as the input.
Even though recycled fiber is environmentally friendly because it reduces landfill amounts,
it is also harmful in that up to 50% of incoming recycled paper can be useless and must
be discarded as sludge. In addition, the processing of recycled paper does not produce the
black liquor or other by-products of wood-fiber processing that mills use to generate their
own electricity (Hillstrom, 1994).
Integrated pulp and paper mills require timber to run, and must run at operating rates
as high as 88% (Korutz, 2003). The mills store an inventory of cut timber that can last
up to 3 months. The companies that own these mills also own timberland from which
they cut timber as needed. However, if they are able to purchase cut and delivered timber
online at a low price or they foresee a need for additional timber in the forecast that will
exceed the inventory or contracted volumes for that period, they forego cutting from their
timberlands and turn to spot markets to purchase additional timber. Although mills use
domestic timber, imported woodpulp, recycled fiber and mill residue as fiber inputs for paper
products, timber is currently the most cost-effective wood-fiber for filling spot demand. The
price paid for the timber on the spot market includes the cutting and delivery of the logs
and is referred to as the delivered price.
As popularity of recycled fiber input increases, the mills find it less profitable to own
their own timberlands; this is especially true now that they have altered their production
process to receive recycled inputs. Along with the costs and risks associated with holding
timberlands, the projected fiber ratios may be an impetus for the shift in timberland own-
ership from industrial ownership to private ownership. The timber supplied from private
sources is expected to grow by 67% compared to a growth of only 17% from other types of
41
ownership. In addition, imports of pulpwood and woodpulp are projected to remain small
relative to domestic supply (Skog et al., 1999). As firms decrease their timberland holdings,
they become more dependent on suppliers of domestic timber when the need for virgin fiber
arises. In recent years, spot market transactions have moved online and suppliers place bids
to sell timber in reverse auctions. Aside from turning to the spot market for ease and prof-
itability of transactions, shifts in land ownership in the procurement supply chain increase
the need for an understanding of what makes timber auctions successful. As auctioneers,
mill management is interested in knowing what influences the supply that is transacted
online.
In Chapters 4.1.1-4.1.3, we provide a general overview of the procurement process for
timber in the southeastern United States, explain the adoption of online auctions for timber
procurement in this market, and explain the auction environment from which our data was
observed. In Chapter 4.2, we investigate the internal and external factors that tend to affect
the volume of timber supplied through an online exchange. In Chapter 4.3, we outline the
statistical analysis used to determine the influence of each factor on the amount of supply
transacted online. In Chapter 4.4, we summarize the results and give industrial implications
of the analysis. In Chapter 4.5, we provide suggestions for future data collection. In Chapter
4.6, we provide insight on possible extensions of this work.
4.1.1 Procurement Process
The procurement process is only a portion of the overall pulp and paper supply chain, which
is depicted in Figure 3. The wood fiber input is converted into paper products at a mill
then shipped to distributors and finally to retailers.
Traditionally, the primary source of timber for mills logging companies in the northern
and western region of the United States has been the national forests. The timber sold
from these forests by the U.S. Forest Service is sold in standardized open and sealed bid
auctions. Because the information from the sale of these forests is public knowledge, there
has been research on the bidding behavior with results on the role of private information
in common value auctions where the volume harvested is unknown beforehand (Athey and
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Figure 3: Pulp & Paper Supply Chain
Levin, 2001). There has also been work done on the relative performance of open and sealed
bid auctions to find that sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders (Athey et al., 2004).
This work corresponds to the activity on the right side of Figure 4. Our work is the first
work that we are aware of that focuses on the bidding activity between the logging company
and the mill.
The procurement process that we consider accounts for the transactions between the
logging companies that resell timber purchased from owners of timberlands and the mill that
converts the timber to paper products. In the United States, private individuals and firms
together own roughly 71% of all timberland. The remaining 29% is owned by government or
public agencies. Most timber purchased in the U.S. is purchased from thousands of private
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landowners. Timberland owned by non-industrialized private landowners accounts for 47%
of growing timber in the United States (USDA 1997).
Many landowners work with consultants to sell the rights to cut timber on their land.
This sale is usually between the landowner and a timber company or a large pulp and paper
company via a sealed bid auction. Timber companies add value to the timber, which is also
known as pulpwood, by logging it and delivering it to mills of the pulp and paper companies
(Figure 4). There are roughly 70, 000 loggers in the United States and 37% of those work
in the Southeast. These roughly 26, 000 loggers work in crews of ten or less. Some of these
roughly 2, 600 crews work independently and some are aggregated by timber companies into
groups of twenty or so to meet the demands of paper mills (USDL 2003).
Figure 4: Procurement Process
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The primary job of the timber company is to aggregate timber from numerous landown-
ers to sell to the large pulp and paper companies. A timber company may contract with
several logging contractors which allows them to purchase different sized tracts of timber to
be logged and sold to a mill. Timber that is sold to a mill is typically logged within a 100
mile radius of that mill to keep transportation costs down. In 2002, 92 mills were operating
and procuring wood from the 13 Southern states (Johnson and Steppleton 2004).There are
numerous timber companies with differing sizes, alliances, business structures, which leaves
them out of comprehensive vertical integration plans of large paper companies. Therefore,
the management of these pulp and paper companies is tasked with gaining price and volume
visibility using options offered by electronic commerce.
4.1.2 Adoption of Online Auctions
The relationships used in securing long-term contracts have also been used to secure spot
market deals. When parties establish long-term relationships, they are more likely to take
the time to negotiate agreeable contracts that define several terms of the relationship such
as flexible price concessions, volume commitments, and product quality. It is reasonable
for these long-term contracts to be relationship-driven for purposes of information sharing,
customized pricing, and price adhesion where price changes trail supply or demand shocks
(Grey et.al 2003). However, for short term contracts where it becomes more important
to secure a price and/or quantity, an auction may prove to be the more beneficial trade
mechanism. One critical factor in the successful implementation of an e-commerce tool is
the auctioneer’s sourcing strategy (Jap, 2002). The role of the Internet has increased in
this regard in the past several years.
As Internet technology advances, companies in the pulp and paper industry have slowly
adopted it for their use. In 1999, a survey revealed that the mill managers were beginning
to access the Internet at the mill. The primary use of the Internet was to acquire industry
news, product information, and communication with customers. Less than 20% of mill man-
agers made purchases of any kind (Shaw, 1999). The trend of using the Internet to access
information began to grow across the industry. Two years later, a survey of managers of
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forest products companies in the United States identified benefits their companies received
from conducting business electronically. The greatest benefits were access to industry in-
formation, real-time transactions, and exposure and access to potential customers (Vlosky,
2001).
A benefit of auctions is that they enable increased market visibility for participants.
With adoption of online capabilities in the form of reverse auctions, companies hoped to
achieve increased market visibility. When a buyer posts a request for some volume of
demand, he is revealing information about the demand he faces in the supply chain. The
hope is that the suppliers will aid the buyer in satisfying the demand. The buyer does not
know whether the supply he sees in the form of price/quantity bids represents all of the
available supply. Mills can benefit most from using a market mechanism that encourages
suppliers to reveal their available supply since the mill’s primary goal in using the reverse
auction is the aggregation of timber supply to satisfy their demand.
The price that mills pay for timber from timber companies includes the price of the
timber, the logging and the hauling costs. This price is referred to as the delivered price.
The delivered price of the timber is influenced by the location of the forest from which it
was logged. This location changes constantly as new tracts of timber are logged.
4.1.3 Overview of B2B Auction Environment
The timber procurement market structure has a high ratio of sellers to buyers. Auction
intermediaries host web sites that allow buyers to initiate reverse auctions. One such site
is ForestExpress.com. Through their online exchange for timber, the Trading Center, mills
and timber suppliers can transact spot quantities of timber by way of reverse auctions. The
format of the Trading Center allows auctioneers to design some properties of the auction
as they choose including the duration, the list of invited bidders (which could include all
of the site’s registered suppliers), the quantity and description of the good, the reservation
price, the bid increment, and the pricing rule. Auctioneers are able to choose among two
pricing rules: discriminatory, where winners pay the amount of their bid and uniform, where
winners pay the lowest accepted price.
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We analyzed data on 507 of the reverse auctions conducted on the Trading Center
for requested tons of delivered timber held over 10 consecutive months. Membership was
required for participation in the online auction exchange. The bidders in each auction were
timber companies who had purchased rights to cut timber on various tracts of land, which
were initially owned by private landowners. The request for timber was posted online and
the mill could invite as few as one bidder to bid. Only invited members that registered and
met quality and delivery requirements could view or submit bids, but if no bidders were
invited, the auction request was open to all members of the exchange. Of the 507 auctions
that were initiated, 58% did not attract any bidders. Because other auctions had multiple
winners, there were 320 separate transactions. The auctions were held at random times
and were initiated by pulp and paper mills. These spot market auctions were for relatively
small volumes.
Each auction typically lasted one week with expected delivery the following week. Each
bid included the volume and price of the timber the timber company could supply. Although
each request included an auction length, delivery location, bid increment, description of the
good, volume, and reservation price, the archived data did not include information on the
delivery location, the invited bidders nor the bid increment.
4.2 Characteristics of Successful Auctions
The volume of timber supplied via online auctions is influenced by factors that are either
internal or external to the auction environment. Internal factors involve the outcome, rules,
and design of the auction. They include activities in which a buyer or supplier may behave
strategically such as in the setting of a reservation price or the decision to place a bid. The
internal factors of the auction that might influence supply are the volume demanded, the
reservation price, the description of the good, the type of good and the number of bidders
invited. We consider the observed responses of the number that actually place bids and the
number of winning bidders.
External factors affect the availability of the timber supply to the logging company.
The external factors that might make participation in a spot market auction difficult or
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unattractive include a reduced logging workforce as many loggers begin to retire, dangerous
logging conditions, competing outlets for sales including satellite chip mills, the option to
hold the timber rights on the spot amount to combine for a long-term contract, and little
or no access to Internet technology.
Conversations with industry experts revealed one external factor that is presumed to
have a large impact on the availability of timber. This factor being logging conditions,
which are directly effected by weather patterns. We include additional data in our model
to account for the impact of logging conditions on the timber supplied in the online reverse
auction.
Our results indicate the extent to which the auction environment and logging conditions
influence the amount of timber supplied through online reverse auctions. We now consider
these internal and external factors in greater detail.
4.2.1 Seasonal Patterns
Seasonal patterns have been found to affect both the price and supply of timber. For
example, stumpage prices of timber sold from national forests in the pacific northwest tend
to be higher in the winter than in the summer. The price of cut timber in the northwest can
be as much as 18% higher in the winter than in the summer (Haynes, 1998). Likewise, in the
southeast, comparatively warmer winter temperatures combined with precipitation make
the ground slippery and logging difficult. Conversely, in the northeastern United States,
competition is likely to increase during the winter months because it is easier for loggers to
remove trees when the ground freezes (Cooner, 2004). Therefore, the impact of weather is
not uniform in the US. The south produces about 55% of the total US harvest (Cubbage
et al., 1998), and the majority of our data came from auctions where the participants were
in the south.
We use three measures to represent the effect of seasonal patterns on timber supply.
They are the expected and actual monthly level of precipitation and the expected and
actual Keetch-Byrum Drought Index (KBDI). The expected precipitation and KBDI are
tested because loggers may make adjustments in external factors such as their labor force
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and long-term contracts based on historical weather information. These adjustments may
have a significant affect on the amount they are able to supply in the spot market.
We collected data on the expected and actual monthly precipitation averages from 1971-
2000 for the southeastern states from the web site of the Southeast Regional Climate Center
(SERCC, 2005). We categorized the months in which auctions were held as wet or dry
according to where the corresponding precipitation values fell in relation to the median
value. The method of evenly dividing the range of values to create categories is also used
by developers of the KBDI.
The KBDI is a more accurate measure than precipitation of the effect of weather factors
on soil moisture, which is a direct influence on logging conditions. The KBDI is used by the
National Forest Service to measure cumulative risk of drought and forest fires. It is a number
representing the net effect of evapotranspiration (the rate of moisture use by vegetation)
and precipitation in producing cumulative moisture deficiency in deep duff and upper soil
layers (Keetch and Byrum, 1968). It was specifically designed to measure the potential of a
forest fire and the KBDI number measures the amount of precipitation necessary to cause
the soil to be saturated or muddy. The values of the index range from 0 to 800 units and
represent a moisture reading ranging from 0 to 8 inches of water through the soil layer. At
8 inches of water, the KBDI assumes saturation. Zero is the point of no moisture deficiency
and 800 is the maximum drought that is possible. At any point along the scale, the index
number indicates the amount of net rainfall that is required to reduce the index to zero,
or saturation (Keetch and Byrum, 1968). It is recorded at Remote Automated Weather
Stations (RAWS) throughout the United States and used primarily in conjunction with
the Wildland Fire Assessment System (WFAS). As a drought measure, it is essentially a
measure of the soil moisture and thus we use it as such.
For the purpose of using the KBDI as a measure of soil moisture in the logging areas
of the southeast, we could not use the reported KBDI output of the RAWS stations for
three reasons. The RAWS stations are not located in all of the areas in the southeast
that are heavily logged so our data would not capture significantly large logging areas
(Figure 5 and 6). In addition, because the RAWS stations are automated, the readings
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are not consistently reported due to various types of malfunctions. Lastly, many of the
RAWS stations are considered to be second order stations, which means that the data from
these stations does not undergo the frequent quality checks by National Weather Service
employees that data from first order stations require.
Figure 5: RAWS station locations [US Wildfire Assessment Service Web Site]
Figure 6: 2001 Softwood Pulpwood Production by State and Broad Species [Johnson and
Steppleton, 2003]
For these reasons, we calculated the KBDI values directly using the mathematical model
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of Keetch and Byrum (1968). The inputs for the model were the precipitation and temper-
ature readings collected from the 2004 database of the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO) of which the National Weather Service (NWS) is a member. This database was
accessed by way of the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC), which is the official source
of weather data in the United States. The majority of the stations we selected to represent
the southeast climates were first order stations.
KBDI is a differential formula, calculating subsequent KBDI as a function of current
KBDI. Therefore, we did require the use of RAWS station output for an initial KBDI
reading for each region as an input for the model. The formula for calculating the daily





where Q is the last observance of the KBDI value (e.g., the previous day), the max daily
temperature is denoted by T , the annual mean rainfall is denoted by R, and the number of
days between observations is denoted by dt. The KBDI is normally calculated on a daily
basis. Because it takes twenty-four hours for 0.20 inches of precipitation to evaporate, this
value is subtracted from the daily precipitation if it exceeds 0.20 inches. The balance is
subtracted from the KBDI value of the previous day and the calculated dQ is then added
to produce the current KBDI value (Keetch and Byrum, 1968). The KBDI values in our
data ranged from 117-587. The points above and below the median index value of 400 were
classified as dry and wet, respectively. For simplification in the regression model, we label
the points above the median with the binary digit one, to signify the higher KDBI value
that corresponds to drier soil conditions. The points below the median are labeled zero
and correspond to wet soil conditions. The expected and actual KBDI values for 2004 are
located in Figure ??.
NCDC is an agency of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
which also has a Climate Diagnostic Center (CDC). The CDC has put together a map
which divides the United States on the county level into areas with similar historical climate
readings such as precipitation and temperature. These areas are called climate divisions.
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Figure 7: Expected and 2004 Actual Monthly KBDI values in the Southeast
Each state is divided into as many as eight climate divisions. Based on the climate divisions,
we were able to assign the output of a weather station to the corresponding woodpulp
productivity in 2001 (Figure 8).
We used the distribution of the logging areas as recorded in the 2001 survey of pulpwood
production (Johnson and Steppleton, 2003). The areas of pulpwood production are fairly
consistent with little change annually. A production change between years is typically less
that 5% (Johnson and Steppleton, 2004).
When we consider the changes in the price and supply of timber with weather changes
using our scaled data set, we found the estimates of the mean price and supply rainy and
dry months to be statistically different with 95% level of confidence. The estimated mean
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Figure 8: Climate Divisions in the South [US Forest Service Web Site]
Table 5: Comparison of Prices and Supply in Rainy and Dry Months
Classification n Mean S.D.
Prices - Rainy 152 41.28 19.10
Prices - Dry 168 40.96 17.84
Supply - Rainy 102 1976 1971
Supply - Dry 110 1645 1645
Data has been uniformly scaled.
price and supply for both weather types were close with large standard deviations (see Table
5). The data was scaled to protect the confidentiality of the users of the Trading Center.
Using average rainfall data for 2004 from the National Weather Service, we divided
the ten calendar months into rainy and dry months according to the expected and actual
monthly precipitation falling above or below the median (Figure 9). The expected rainy
months were March, June, July, August, and September. The actual rainy months in
our data set were February, June, July, August and September. The expected and actual
average rainfall in the southeast for these months was above the median of 4.54 and 4 inches,
respectively. The expected dry months were January, February, April, May, and October.
The actual dry months were January, March, April, May and October.
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Figure 9: Expected and 2004 Actual Monthly Rainfall in the Southeast
4.2.2 Description of Good
An initial observation of the auction data revealed that the description of the good was
related to other factors. Requests for timber that is cut to a custom length tended to have
few bidders if any at all compared to auctions for timber of a standard length.
We found the estimates of the mean number of bidders for custom cut and standard
length auctions to be statistically different with 95% level of confidence. The estimated
mean number of bidders for the standard good was roughly quadruple that of the custom
cut (see Table 6).
The description of the good was also related to whether there was a supply buildup over
time (Figure 10). For example, we looked at the auctions of timber with custom descriptions
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Table 6: Comparison of Bids for Custom and Standard Cuts of Timber
Classification n Mean S.D.
Custom Bids 315 0.32 0.71
Standard Bids 192 1.24 1.27
Table 7: Sawlog and Plylog Supply vs. Time between auction closes
Classification n t-value p-value R-sq
Time b/n Sawlog Sales 14 -1.36 0.200 13.3%
Time b/n Plylog Sales 31 3.71 0.001 32.2%
Time b/n Standard Sales 139 0.79 0.429 0.5%
Time b/n Custom Sales 208 -0.09 0.932 0.0%
that had the greatest numbers of successful auctions. They were the auctions for custom
cut plylogs and cut medium sawlogs. The successful timber auctions for plylogs tended to
see an increase in the amount supplied as the time between the close of auctions increased.
A simple regression analysis on the effect of time between sales of plylogs on the amount
supplied showed a significant relationship with a p-value of 0.001. However, no significant
relationship was found for successful auctions of sawlogs, which had a p-value of 0.2 (Table
7).
Figure 10: Scatterplot of Effect of Time between Sales on Plylog and Sawlog Online Supply
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When we considered the effect of time between the close of auctions on standard and
custom goods of all descriptions, we found there to be no significant relationship with a p-
value of 0.429 for standard and a p-value of 0.932 for custom. Therefore, we did not include
the time between auctions as a factor in the multi-variable regression model. Instead, we
created a third category of description for plylogs because the successful auctions for plylogs
represented about 40% of the successful custom auctions and aside from the other custom
auctions, the supply of custom cut plylogs was related to the time between the close of the
auctions.
Even if a supplier has the supply of timber and ability to cut it to order, she may not
want to conduct the transaction to supply a custom order by online auction. This may be
particularly true if the supplier does not regularly fill requests for custom orders.
There is less competition for custom orders and the price of custom orders tends to be
higher than standard orders. In public auctions, when the item for auction is unique, the
seller of the item initiates a forward auction. In B2B reverse auctions, where the seller
cannot host a forward auction and the competition between them is lower, the seller and
buyer would likely do better to negotiate over non-price attributes of the custom order than
to participate in an auction.
4.2.3 Species of Timber
Hardwood and softwood are the two broad species of timber. The wood from broad-leaved
trees such as oak is called hardwood and the wood from conifers such as pine is called soft-
wood. Hardwood is known for its smooth fibers and is used in the production of bathroom
and facial tissue and hardwood floors whereas softwood fibers are known for their strength
and are useful in the production of paper bags, frames for homes, and corrugated boxes
used in shipping.
In the southeastern United States, softwood trees grow and are logged in more abun-
dance than hardwoods (Figures 6, 11 and 12). Softwood accounts for 60 − 70% of total
Southern timber harvests (USDL, 1988). Therefore, the supply transacted in auctions in
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which hardwood is requested is likely to be lower. Hardwood, in some cases may be re-
quested as a substitute for softwood and a mix of the two woods may be used to make
paper. An initial survey of the data revealed that 39% of the auctions initiated requested
hardwood.
Figure 11: Major Forest Cover Types in the Southern United States [Eyre 1980]
4.2.4 Bidders
Empirical research on the relationship between the number of bidders and the success of
procurement auctions shows that the number of bidders is influential in the competition
witnessed in the auction (Millet et al, 2004). They suggest that subject to cost-benefit
analysis, firms allocate resources to developing suppliers who will be high-quality bidders.
We are interested in the significance of the number of bidders to the volume supplied online
in our data to determine if mills need to consider developing bidders. In our data, we have an
average of 1.24 bidders with a standard deviation of 1.2 and the number of bidders ranging
from zero to eight. Accordingly, the majority of the auctions were not competitive and the
full amount demanded was not supplied. This may be due to underdeveloped suppliers or
another reason.
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Figure 12: 2001 Hardwood Pulpwood Production by State and Broad Species [Johnson
and Steppleton, 2003]
4.2.5 Demand and Reservation Price
As its demand increases, the mill desires a corresponding increase in the supply of timber.
This desire might be indicated in the increase of the reservation price as the need of the
mill for timber increases.
4.3 Regression Analysis
The goal of the regression analysis is to see how significant the internal and external factors
were in influencing the volume of timber (Supply) transacted in online reverse auctions. The
predictor variables we considered for analysis were the expected monthly precipitation, the
actual monthly precipitation, the weighted average actual and expected soil moisture in the
timber producing regions of the south on the closing day of the auction as measured using
the KBDI index (KBDI), the expected KBDI in the Southeast (ExpKBDI), the volume of
delivered timber requested (Demand), the categories for the number of bidders (BidCat),
whether the description of the timber requested was for timber of standard length or for a
custom cut (Descrp), the species of timber (Species), and the reservation price (Res) set by
the auctioning mill. Both Demand and Supply are in units of tons. The variables for the
expected and actual monthly precipitation, the species, the actual and expected KBDI, and
the description of the requested tree were binary. The demand, supply, and reservation price
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Table 8: Regression Variables
Variables Description Units
Supply Cumulative supply from winning bidders tons
Demand Demand posted by the auctioneer tons
BidCat Category of number of bidders 0=zero bidders, 1=one or two,
2= more than two bidders
Res Reservation price set by auctioneer $
Species Species of tree requested 1=hardwood, 0=softwood
Descrp Description of demand as 1=custom cut or tree length
listed by the auctioneer 0=mixed hardwood or softwood
ExpPrecp Expected monthly precipitation 1=wet, 0=dry
ActPrecp Actual monthly precipitation 1=wet, 0=dry
KBDI Keetch-Byrum Drought Index 1=dry, 0=wet
ExpKBDI Expected Keetch-Byrum Drought Index 1=dry, 0=wet
were continuous quantitative variables. The number of bidders was categorical with a zero
representing no bidders, one representing one or two bidders, and two representing more
than two bidders. The variables, their descriptions and units of measure are summarized
in Table 8. In running a stepwise regression using the Minitab software package, a p-value
was set to 0.15 to enter and exit the model. The final regression model is as outlined in
Table 9. There were 45 predictors and 507 complete observations.
4.4 Summary
4.4.1 Internal Factors
The description (Descrp) of the good had a significant relationship with the amount sup-
plied. From our initial observation of the data, we found that 62% of the descriptions
included a reference to the cut or length of the timber and represented 82% of the unsuc-
cessful auctions so a relationship between description and volume supplied was expected.
From the correlation matrix, in Table 11, which was also run using Minitab, we see that
there is a negative correlation between the description of the good and the amount supplied.
This indicates that custom goods tended to attract less supply.
The number of bidding suppliers sorted by category (BidCat) was also significantly
related to the amount supplied and had the highest correlation with supply. This is expected
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∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10.
R-sq = 71.9, R-sq(adj) = 71.0
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics
Variables n Min Max Mean S.D.
Supply 507 0 8,000 755 1,471
Demand 507 1 20,000 2,317 2,464
BidCat 507 0 2 0.48 0.62
Res 507 0 96.63 45.37 20.59
Species 507 0 1 0.39 0.49
Descrp 507 0 1 0.62 0.49
ExpPrecp 507 0 1 0.41 0.49
ActPrecp 507 0 1 0.43 0.5
KBDI 507 1 0 0.47 0.5
ExpKBDI 507 1 0 0.44 0.49
60
Table 11: Correlation Matrix
Variables Supply Demand BidCat Res Species Descrp ExpPrecp ActPrecp KBDI
Demand 0.513*
BidCat 0.712* 0.315*
Res -0.016 -0.104 -0.109
Species 0.053 0.158* 0.035 -0.518*
Descrp -0.162* -0.128 -0.313* 0.613* -0.035
ExpPrecp 0.101 0.136 0.068 0.051 0.064 -0.025
ActPrecp 0.101 0.116 0.069 -0.02 0.048 -0.084 0.275*
KBDI 0.100 0.189* 0.134 -0.103 0.167* -0.098 0.364* 0.326*
ExpKBDI 0.117 0.198* 0.138 -0.122 0.171* -0.094 0.316* 0.275* 0.927*
∗p < 0.001
because if the auctions had no bidders then the amount supplied was certain to be zero.
From our initial observation of the data, we found that 58% of the auctions did not attract
any bidders so a strong relationship between bid category and volume supplied was expected.
From the descriptive statistics in Table 10, we see that the mean bid category was between
one and two. This indicates that on average the auctions had less than two total bidders.
We found that the bid category was significantly related to the description of the good.
The negative correlation indicates that more suppliers were available to bid when the good
for auction was standard timber than when it was for custom timber. Because there is
a significant correlation between the bid category and the description, we conclude that
before resources are allocated to develop suppliers, mills should be conservative in their
expectations of the supply available, especially for custom goods.
The demand (Demand) for the good had a significant positive affect on the volume
supplied. As more volume was demanded, more volume was supplied. This relationship
is apparent in the correlation matrix in Table 11. We see that the demand was positively
correlated with supply.
The supply was significantly related to the reservation price (Res). This is likely because
of the significant price difference between the custom and standard timber. The reservation
price had a small but negative correlation with supply. Because the reservation price was
highly correlated with the description at a significant value of 0.613, a higher reservation
price is most likely associated with custom goods, which tended to have fewer successful
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auctions. So there is an indirect relationship between the reservation price and supply. This
is confirmed by the significant interaction between the reservation price and the description,
a detailed discussion of which is to follow.
There was a combined effect of demand and the bidder category which had a positive
affect on the volume of supply. From Table 11, we see that demand and bidder category
were positively correlated with each other as well as with supply. Therefore, an increase in
either variable was related to an increase in supply. In addition, an increase in the volume
demanded tended to be accompanied by an increase in the number of bidders. This indicates
that large volumes of demand accompanied by a relatively large number of bidders were
important factors in realizing high volumes of supply.
The bid category and the reservation price had a combined positive affect on the volume
supplied. These two variables were negatively correlated indicating that an increase in the
reservation price was associated with a decrease in the number of bidders. This is a counter-
intuitive result because one would assume that a supplier would prefer to sell her goods at
a higher price should a buyer make such an offer. The counter-intuitive result may be due
to the high correlation that both variables have with the description of the timber. Timber
that had a description that included terms such as ’custom cut’ or ’tree length’ tended to
have a higher reservation price and a lower number of bidders. From our initial observations
of the data we found 62% of the auctions had requests for customized timber. In addition,
there was a combined effect of reservation price and description on the volume supplied.
The coefficient was negative indicating that a higher reservation price for a custom good
was likely to have less supply than otherwise. As a result, it is likely that the behavior
of bidders toward customized timber has a greater affect on volume than how they would
behave toward a standard good.
There was a significant negative effect of demand and description on the volume supplied.
From the correlation matrix, we see that there is a significant negative correlation between
demand and description, which indicates that as one variable increases the other decreases.
An increase in the description variable means that the timber has a custom description
and a further increase corresponds to description of custom cut plywood. This means that
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the online demand for custom timber or plywood tended to be higher than the demand
for standard wood. In addition, the volume of supply transacted online tended to decrease
when the auction was for custom goods or plylogs.
The species (Species) was not found to have significant influence on the volume supplied.
Given the lower amount of hardwood grown in the south, one would suspect the auctions
for hardwood to be less successful than those for softwood. The fact that species was
not significant in influencing supply indicates that the suppliers did not find it difficult to
satisfy the hardwood demands for the lower volumes transacted in a spot market. Timber
companies and mills may prefer to transact hardwood online because the softwood is logged
for larger contracts and because hardwood can be added to softwood for the production of
paper.
4.4.2 External Factors
Of the three indicators of seasonal patterns, only one proved to be independently significant
in predicting the volume supplied online. The actual precipitation (ActualPrecp)had a
significant negative relationship with the volume supplied. As the number of inches of
actual precipitation increased, the amount of volume supplied decreased. This is intuitive
as the precipitation is a factor in the ability of loggers to log and deliver timber.
Each indicator of seasonal patterns had combined affects on the amount supplied online.
The actual precipitation and the demand had a combined affect on the volume supplied.
They had a significant positive influence and they were positively correlated. Therefore, and
increase in the actual precipitation and the volume demanded corresponded to an increase
in the volume supplied. This result seems counter-intuitive because actual precipitation
alone has a significant negative relationship with supply. But because demand alone has a
significant positive relationship with supply and a strong correlation, the combined affect
on supply was positive. This indicates that for larger demand, loggers are able to fill supply.
This could be for a host of reasons including that loggers may be more willing to tap into
all-weather stands of trees when the volume requested is large. These stands tend to be at
higher elevations and are less influenced by precipitation compared to stands in the valley.
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The expected KBDI (ExpKBDI) was more significant than the actual KBDI and the two
are highly correlated. The expected KBDI and demand had a significant combined affect
on the volume supplied. They were also significantly and positively correlated indicating
that an increase in the expected KBDI value corresponded to an increase in the amount
demanded. This means that an increase in the volume demanded and better logging con-
ditions, measured by a decrease in soil moisture, corresponded to a decrease in the volume
supplied online. This result is intuitive when we consider the fact that when the logging
conditions are suitable, a mill is better off obtaining wood offline either by cutting from its
own woodlands or by using the supply from its long-term contracts.
The expected precipitation interacted with both the demand and the number of bid-
ders. The expected precipitation combined with each factor to have opposing affects on the
volume supplied. Demand that was requested in a month that was expected to have higher
precipitation, corresponded with a decrease in the volume supplied. In addition, an increase
in the number of bidders during months that were expected to have higher levels of precipi-
tation corresponded to an increase in the volume supplied. There was a significant positive
correlation between expected precipitation and demand although no significant correlation
was found with the bid category. It follows intuition that more volume be demanded online
in periods that were expected to have more rain as mills want to make sure they have more
than enough timber to avoid a shortage. To do so, they turn to the spot market. It also
follows that the volume of supply increases when more loggers are available in periods of
expected precipitation.
As we compare the effect of the expected and actual levels of precipitation each month
and the expected and actual KBDI values on the volume supplied, we first consider the
correlation between the values. There is a significant positive correlation between each of
the measures of seasonal patterns. There is a less strong positive correlation between the
precipitation and KBDI values which is most likely because the KBDI considers the effect of
temperature and other variables on soil moisture in addition to precipitation. Precipitation
in a winter month will likely not have the same affect on logging conditions as the same
amount of precipitation in a summer month.
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We next compare the effects of the interactions between the KBDI, the actual and ex-
pected precipitation, and the demand on supply. We find that when the month is expected
to have high precipitation and the demand is increased, the supply decreases. Likewise,
when there is more expected soil moisture as shown by a higher KBDI and an increased
demand, the supply decreases. However, when the month actually does have high pre-
cipitation and demand is increased, the supply increases. This implies that the historical
patterns of precipitation do not necessarily set the environment for the market and that
the market is somewhat elastic with respect to the current logging conditions. It is possible
that logging crews and long-term contracts are determined based on past weather patterns
but current weather conditions have an affect on supply.
We also considered the independent effect of the time between auctions on the supply
considering that suppliers might have time to gather supply between auctions. We found
no significant relationship for goods with a standard or custom description (see Figure 13).
Figure 13: Scatterplot of Effect of Time between Sales on Standard and Custom Online
Supply
4.4.3 Selected Pricing Rule
One effect of each auction rule on the price and quantity that a bidder submits is that a
bidder has a stronger incentive to reduce the quantity portion of her bid under the uniform
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rule than under the discriminatory rule (Tenorio, 1997). The idea is that the winners of
the uniform rule pay the lowest accepted price for each awarded unit hence it is better for a
bidder to reduce her quantity to compete with lower quantity bidders and let lower valuing
bidders enter the set of winners. The private value multi-unit auction framework used in
this exchange employs the discriminatory pricing rule. Therefore, we look for evidence of
that suppliers do not reduce the quantity they supply in these auctions.
There were multiple winners and the winners were chosen based on price then volume.
The discriminatory pricing rule is used so the price at which each supplier sells her volume
is equal to the lowest bid that she placed. In the majority of the auctions, the winning bid
prices were close, if not equal, to the opening price set by the auctioneer. This indicates that
there was little competition over price because the volume request was not yet filled. The
objective of the auction tended to be securing volume at a price suitable to the auctioning
mill. With volume being the dominant factor in these auctions, a strategic supplier should
not benefit from withholding the sale of volume if the prices in the high and low price season
have been scaled to realize seasonal differences in cost.
The reservation price is a significant independent predictor of supply but it is not signif-
icantly correlated with the number of bidders nor with the demand or supply. This implies
that a change in the reservation price will not attract or discourage the amount supplied
via online auctions for timber. The reservation price is also not significantly correlated with
the seasonal indicators of precipitation or KBDI values. In total, this implies that suppliers
do not have a price-incentive to withhold supply in a dry month in favor of a better price
in a rainy month.
The fact that the reservation price is not significantly correlated with several key internal
and external factors nor with the volume supplied does not contradict the idea that the
discriminatory auction that is implemented assists in the prevention of suppliers placing
bids for a lower quantity than they have available as predicted by Tenorio (1997).
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4.5 Industrial Implications
Based on this analysis, the low aggregation of timber supply online is most significantly
associated with the description of the good, the volume demanded and the number of
bidders. Successful auctions on the exchange were more often for standard goods than
for commodities although some custom goods, such as plylogs were successfully transacted
online.
The output of the model is useful in characterizing the supply transacted via the on-
line auctions of the Trading Center exchange. Behavior outside of the exchange is likely
influenced by a number of important external market factors that are not accounted for in
the exchange data. For example, different auctioneer goals and auction rules, the collusion
between suppliers, the size of suppliers, trends in the logging labor force, the influence of
substitutes such as the recovered paper international market and the latest installation of
satellite chip mills to name a few all affect the characterization of total supply.
Pulp and paper mills should gain a firm understanding of their procurement needs
and determine whether the current auction design assists them in reaching their goal of
accumulating supply. They should consider alternative outlets for procuring customized
timber should they seek a higher success rate. Mills should consider these findings for
dedicated analysis of their electronic procurement decision process and their spot market
strategy in particular.
The number of bidding suppliers sorted by category (BidCat) had the largest indepen-
dent influence on the amount supplied. It also had the highest correlation with supply.
This indicates that the bidders were constrained in the amount of supply they could satisfy.
Therefore to satisfy demand, mills should invite as many suppliers to bid as possible. This
is withstanding qualitative preferences that may take precedence over volume even on the
spot market but because all bidders must meet requirements to become members of the
exchange, the qualitative preferences should not play a large role in auction behavior.
The relationship between the time between the close of auctions and the supply of timber
was different depending on the description of the timber. For example, the time between
the close of successful auctions for sawlogs did not have a significant relationship with the
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volume of sawlogs supplied but there was a significant relationship with the volume of plylogs
supplied. This suggests that the online marketplace is more successful in fulfilling requests
for certain descriptions of timber. More work into the effectiveness of the marketplace in
meeting specific demands could characterize in more detail the industry market behavior
both offline and online.
4.6 Recommendations for Additional Data Collection
There has been much research activity concerning bidder behavior surrounding the timber
that is auctioned from the U.S. Forest Service. The empirical research results were made
possible because the outcome of the auction is public information. However, the outcome
of auctions between logging companies and private landowners is not public. A third-party
online auction host that is able to collect sufficient data on the auctions that it processes can
serve its clients by recommending the auction design that will be most efficient in reaching
client goals.
We were not able to incorporate all of the potential predictors in our model because of
unavailability of data. As the value of e-commerce increases for procurement in the pulp
and paper industry, additional factors should be considered for further study. Data on
two specific factors would shed light on bidder behavior over time. The first factor is the
geographic location of the mill and the tracts from which the timber is logged. This data
would allow the study on behavior between mills and logging companies over time in the
context of a sequential auction. For example, do the same suppliers tend to bid and are
there certain types of auction requests that certain logging companies tend to fill?
The second factor is the number of the invited bidders. This second factor has been
shown to be fairly significant and closely related to the number of bidders when the type of
auction conducted allows for the current winning bid to be revealed to other bidders. The
behavior of invited bidders has been studied because not all invited bidders submit bids
even after they have accepted the invitation to participate in the auction. The percent of
the invited bidders that actually place a bid was found to be the most significant factor
after number of bids (Millet et al. 2004). Information on this second factor will help mills
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determine a minimum number of bidders to purposefully invite to assure that all requested
demand is filled and satisfy the goal of the auction. Although logic would dictate that
to satisfy the goal of the auction auctioneers would invite all bidders to participate in
every auction, the fact that businesses are selective in who they invite to bid in an auction
gives evidence that they do want to control to whom they reveal their demand. Having a
minimum number in mind may help them weigh the benefit of accomplishing their auction
goal with the risk of revealing information about their demand.
4.7 Future Research
Some interesting extensions of this work might involve the development of auction models
that consider resale opportunities in determining the auction outcome. A similar study was
done for timber auctions from the U.S. Forest Service (Haile, 2001) and concluded that
bidder valuations were higher when the value of the option to sell in the resale market was
high and the option value to buy in the resale market was low.
Also, further study on the application of this model to other time periods of auction
activity for timber procurement would help validate its usefulness as a predictive model for
expected supply from an initiated auction.
We did not include the spot market supply for the raw material recovered fiber, which
is a substitute for the natural wood fiber of timber. The pulp and paper industry has set
the goal of increasing the use of recovered paper as an input by 60% by year 2006 (Pulp
& Paper Weekly, 2004). When logging becomes difficult during wet-weather months, pulp
and paper mills can turn to recovered fiber for input.
The spot market is used to handle fluctuations in demand in other commodity markets
as well (Bichler, et al., 2002). Some examples include chemicals (ChemConnect.com) and
electricity (Chonawee, S. et al., 2001). The external factor that is similar among agricultural
commodity spot markets is that of seasonal patterns. Futures markets already incorporate
the effect of weather on market performance. For commodities that are not agricultural
products, external factors such as substitutes and business relationships may be important
factors to gauge in the measurement of auction success. The design of the auction will
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dictate how important the internal factors of the auction will be. For example, a sequential
auction will have time sensitive factors to consider while a combinatorial auction will have




In this dissertation, we have theoretically and empirically studied the influence of auction
design on the outcome of the auction. The goals of the auction participants included
maximizing expected return from the auction or maximizing auction success as measured
by transaction volume. Apart from the theoretical results of sequential auction designs, we
studied the implementation of a single auction design used in an online exchange for timber
procurement. We found that apart from the auction design, factors that are either internal
or external to the auction environment can affect the success of the auction participants in
reaching their goals.
We developed a new auction design, the alternating reverse and forward auction, which
allows buyers and suppliers to alternate auction roles of bidder and auctioneer in a sequential
auction. We compared the performance of this new auction design with that of two con-
ventional auction designs, the reverse and forward sequential auction. We also determined
the optimal bid strategy for each market side.
We further developed the conditions under which each auction design would be a market
equilibrium and when neither of the conventional auction designs would be an equilibrium.
We found the alternating auction to be a viable alternative to holding no auction at all
when neither the forward nor the reverse auction is a market equilibrium. We then studied
the conditions for each auction design to be an equilibrium auction design for a specific
case of up to twenty suppliers and periods. We found the reverse auction to be the most
robust auction design preference of our PDSM models. Furthermore, in the test range, the
RFA auction is an equilibrium when there are an even number of periods and at least three
buyers.
We found that an upper bound exists on the number of periods in the RA and FA
PDSM auction models when there are at least three buyers. There exists a conditional
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upper bound on the number of periods in the RFA model. The benefit of an additional
period to the expected return depends on the value of variables in most cases. We also
determined the value to a strategic supplier of the option to learn her future valuation in
a two period sequence, which is important because she is subject to a negative expected
profit when initiating a forward auction in the second period.
Using data from a transaction processing network that hosts online business-to-business
timber auctions and that was interested in increasing the number of successful auctions, we
found plausible explanations for online auction performance. This work is the first work
that we are aware of that focuses on the bidding activity between the logging company
and the mill. Based on our analysis, the aggregation of timber supply online is most
significantly associated with the description of the good, the volume demanded and the
number of bidders. Some custom goods, such as plylogs were successfully transacted online,
however, successful auctions on the exchange were more often for standard goods than for
commodities. As the value of e-commerce increases for procurement in the pulp and paper
industry, additional factors should be considered for further study.
The collection of additional data would enable researchers to empirically test predictive
models of industry behavior. This would be especially beneficial if the online auction activity
was coupled by a derivatives market for timber production, which may be an option given
the current industry transition and projected increased dependence of mills on privately
owned timber.
Both markets and individual auction participants use online auctions strategically. As
they explore the options available through online auctions, they are able to understand
what works well for their particular business environment and what does not.
The goal of this thesis was to investigate how online auctions can be used to achieve
stability in markets. Specifically, we studied how the online auction mechanism has been
used in an industrial setting and a new auction design to that may aid in increasing the
adoption on online auctions by hesitant participants. This goal has been accomplished.
We now understand that the alternating auction sequence is a viable option for online
business-to-business auctions and in some cases is an equilibrium. We have also studied
72
bidder behavior in timber auctions between logging companies and mills for a plausible
explanation for the outcome of low aggregation of supply in the online auctions. The
auctions for timber between these two segments of the market had not previously been
studied. These are contributions to the body of knowledge in the field of auction design.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 3.4.1-3.4.8
In all of the following proofs, the assumption of bidder symmetry in the independent private
values model allows us to study an arbitrary buyer or supplier; all others will behave in the
same way.
Proposition 3.4.1(RA Expected Supplier Profit and Bid Strategy)The optimal equi-
librium bid function when competing in the N th-to-last period of a PDSM reverse auction
with S suppliers is
bN = vN +
N − 1
S(S −N + 1) .
The expected profit to a supplier competing in the N th-to-last period of a PDSM reverse






S(S −N + 1) .
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
We first consider the last auction in the sequence and use N as our index for the purposes
of induction (i.e., N = 1). Let v(1) ≤ v(2) ≤ ... ≤ v(S) be the order statistics of the S bidder
types in the N th-to-last period. Because the auctions we consider are sequential English
auctions, for N = 1, the symmetric equilibrium strategy is to bid b1 = v1 (Milgrom and
Weber, 2000)., where v1 is the valuation in this period. Using integration-by-parts, the




(v(2) − v1)(S − 1)(1− v(2))S−2dv(2)
= −
[













Now we assume our induction hypothesis for the N th-to-last period. Specifically, we assume
that the optimal bid function is
bN = vN +
N − 1
S(S −N + 1)






S(S −N + 1) .
We now show that our bid function and the expected profit hold for the (N +1)st-to-last
period. Note that in the (N + 1)st-to-last period, vN is not yet known, so we integrate over
all possible values.
In the following equation, we substitute r for vN+1 in the limits of integration in order
to derive the bid function by assuming that one strategic bidder of type vN+1 chooses to
bid as type r instead. Although r is a function of vN+1, for notational simplicity, we write
r in the equation instead of writing it as a function of a private valuation. The necessary
first order condition is determined with respect to r.
Note that because the winning supplier leaves after each auction period, having S suppli-











PN (vN )f(vN )dvN
]












((S + 1)− 1)((S + 1)−N) +
(1− vN )(S+1)−1
(S + 1)− 1 )f(vN )dvN
]
∗((S + 1)− 1)(1− F (v(2)))((S+1)−2)f(v(2))dv(2).
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We obtain the first order conditions using Leibnitz’s rule where r is a function of vN+1:
dPN+1
dr
= −(bN+1(r)− vN+1) ∗ ((S + 1)− 1)(1− r)(S+1)−2
+[
N − 1
((S + 1)− 1)((S + 1)−N) +
1
(S + 1)((S + 1)− 1) ]((S + 1)− 1)(1− r)
(S+1)−2 ≡ 0
= ((S + 1)− 1)(1− r)(S+1)−2[ N − 1
((S + 1)− 1)((S + 1)−N) +
1
(S + 1)((S + 1)− 1)
+vN+1 − bN+1(r)]
= ((S + 1)− 1)(1− r)(S+1)−2[ (S + 1)N − (S + 1) + (S + 1)−N
(S + 1)((S + 1)− 1)((S + 1)−N) + vN+1 − bN+1(r)]
= ((S + 1)− 1)(1− r)(S+1)−2[ N((S + 1)− 1)
(S + 1)((S + 1)− 1)((S + 1)−N) + vN+1 − bN+1(r)]
= ((S + 1)− 1)(1− r)(S+1)−2[ N
(S + 1)((S + 1)−N) + vN+1 − bN+1(r)].
We now solve for the bid function:
bN+1(r) = vN+1 +
N
(S + 1)((S + 1)−N) .
Because the right hand side of the bid function does not depend on r,
bN+1(vN+1) = vN+1 +
N
(S + 1)((S + 1)−N) .
The derivative of the expected profit, P
′
N+1 > (<)0 when bN+1(vN+1) < (>)vN+1 +
N
(S+1)((S+1)−N) . Therefore bN+1(vN+1) is the optimal equilibrium response for the bidder of
type vN+1 in the (N +1)st-to-last auction period. The first term, vN+1, is the bidder private
valuation in the (N + 1)st-to-last period. This bid function shows that bidders inflate their
bids above their private valuation. The amount of bid inflation depends on the number of
competing suppliers and the length of the auction sequence.
As expected, bids will be inflated more in longer sequences because the increased future
opportunities make accepting a smaller profit in the current period less attractive. Similarly,
a shorter sequence with the same number of bidders will have increased competition and
cause bids to be inflated less, because there are fewer opportunities available.
We substitute this optimal bid function into (13). Because the strategic supplier will













((S + 1)− 1)((S + 1)−N) +
(1− vN )(S+1)−1
(S + 1)− 1 f(vN )dvN
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((S + 1)− 1)((S + 1)−N) +
1
(S + 1)((S + 1)− 1)
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(S + 1)((S + 1)−N)
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(S + 1)((S + 1)−N)

(1− (1− vN+1)(S+1)−1).








(1− v(2))(S+1)−1(v(2) + N



















(S + 1)(S + 1−N) +
N(1− (1− vN+1)(S+1)−1)






(S + 1)(S + 1−N) .
¥
This expected profit function is comprised of the expected profit from the current auction
and the future expected profit.





(N − 1)(1− vN )S−1
S(S −N + 1) .
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The contribution to the expected profit of losing in the N th − to− last period and winning
in a subsequent period is
PBN =
(N − 1)(1− (1− vN )S−1)
S(S −N + 1) .
Note that, as would be expected PN = PAN + P
B
N .
Propositions 3.4.2 and 3.4.4(RFA Expected Supplier Profit and Bid Strategy) The
expected profit to a supplier in the N th-to-last period of a PDSM alternating auction















S − 2q ))

1






S − 2p− 2

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S − 2q + 1))

1






S − 2p− 1

.
When N is an even number (i.e., the supplier is a bidder), the optimal bid function is
bN (vN ) = vN +
B − 3
2(B + 1)(S − 1) + ∆N .
Proof of Propositions 3.4.2 and 3.4.4
Recall that we assume that every RFA sequence ends with a forward auction. We first
assume that there is only one auction in the sequence. Since it is a forward auction, the






















∗(S − 1)(1− F (v(2)))S−2f(v(2))dv(2).
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We obtain the first order conditions using Leibnitz’s rule. Although r is a function of v2,
,for notational simplicity, we write r in the equation instead of writing it as a function of a
private valuation, which yields
dP2
dr
= −(b2(r)− v2)(S − 1)(1− r)S−2 + B − 32(B + 1)(S − 1)(S − 1)(1− r)
S−2
= (S − 1)(1− r)S−2[ B − 3
2(B + 1)(S − 1) + v2 − b2(r)] ≡ 0.
We solve for b2(r), which yields
b2(r) = v2 +
B − 3
2(B + 1)(S − 1) .
Because the bid function does not depend on r,
b2(v2) = v2 +
B − 3
2(B + 1)(S − 1) .
which is positive for B ≥ 3. The derivative of the expected profit, P ′2(v2) > (<) 0 when
b2(v2) < (>) v2 + B−32(B+1)(S−1) . Therefore b2(v2) is the optimal equilibrium response for the
bidder of type v2 in the second-to-last alternating auction period. This bid function shows
that the suppliers inflate their bids above their private valuation. The amount of the bid
inflation depends on the number of buyers and suppliers.
We substitute this optimal bid function into equation(14). Because a strategic supplier
will bid as her true type, v2, we replace r with v2 in the limits of integration. The total












































2(B + 1)(S − 1)
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(B − 3)(1− v2)S−1
2(B + 1)(S − 1) .




































































































2(S − 1)(B + 1)
)
(1− (1− v2)S−1).
Hence the result holds for N = 1 and N = 2.
For the remaining sequences, we will assume that N is even and prove by induction the
result when N +1 is odd. Then, we assume that N is odd and prove the result when N +1
is even.
Assume that the expected profit to a supplier participating in the N th-to-last period of
a PDSM alternating auction that begins with a reverse auction (i.e., N is even) is





2(B + 1)(S − 1) + ∆N .
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and the optimal bid function in the N th-to-last period is
bN (vN ) = vN +
B − 3

















S − 2p− 1
]
.
The total expected profit for an N + 1 period sequence of alternating auctions that
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(S + 1)− 2) · · · (1−
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(S + 1)− 2p− 2

.
Hence, for odd values of N , the result holds.
Now assume that when the expected profit to the supplier participating in the N th-to-
last period of a PDSM alternating auction sequence that begins with a forward auction













S − 2q ))
[
1




S − 2p− 2
]
.












∗ ((S + 1)− 1)(1− F (v(2)))(S+1)−2f(v(2))dv(2)
We obtain the first order conditions using Leibnitz’s rule. Although r is a function of vN+1,
for notational simplicity, we write r in the equation instead of writing it as a function of a
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private valuation, which yields
dPN+1
dr




PN (vN )f(vN )dvN ]((S + 1)− 1)(1− r)(S+1)−2 ≡ 0.
We solve for bN+1(r), which is




The right hand side of the bid function does not depend on r, so



















S − 2q ))
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((S + 1)− 1) + ΥN+1
= vN+1 +
B − 3


















(S + 1)− 2p− 3
]
.
The bid function is positive when B ≥ 3. The derivative of the expected profit, P ′N+1 >
(<) 0 when bN+1(vN+1) < (>) vN+1 + B−32(B+1)((S+1)−1) + ΥN+1. Therefore bN+1(vN+1) is
the optimal equilibrium response for the bidder of type vN+1 in the first of an alternating
sequence.
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PN (vN )f(vN )dvN
]
∗ ((S + 1)− 1)(1− F (v(2)))(S+1)−2f(v(2))dv(2).
We substitute the optimal bid function into equation (21). Because a strategic supplier
will bid as her true type, vN+1, when using the optimal bid function, we replace r with










PN (vN )f(vN )dvN
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2(B + 1)((S + 1)− 1) + ΥN+1




































= (1− vN+1)S+1 + B − 3
2(B + 1)((S + 1)− 1) + ΥN+1.
Hence for an even value of N , the result holds.¥
Proposition 3.4.3(FA Expected Supplier Profit) The expected profit to a supplier
competing in the N th-to-last period of a PDSM forward auction sequence with B buyers












S − q ))
B−1
B+1 − 12
S − p− 1 .
Proof of Proposition 3.4.3
We consider the last auction in the sequence (i.e., N = 1). The expected profit to the
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S − q ))
B−1
B+1 − 12
S − p− 1 .
We now consider a supplier’s expected profit if she is competing in the (N + 1)st-to-last







































































































































(S + 1)− 1) · · · (1−
1

























(S + 1)− p− 1 ,




(S+1) is the expected profit from hosting the (N + 1)
st-to-last
period and the summation term is the future expected profit if the supplier is not able to
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host the forward auction in the first period but is able to host an auction in one of the
future periods. ¥
Proposition 3.4.5(RA Expected Buyer Surplus) The expected surplus to a buyer in














, if N = 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.5
We first consider the last auction in the sequence (i.e., N = 1). Because this is the last
period, each supplier will bid her valuation. Assuming the buyer who initiates the auction


























S(S − 1) +
2(1− v(2))S+1











S(S − 1) −
2






where (22) is from the integration-by-parts of the preceding line as follows:
∫ 1
0
(w1v(2) − v2(2))(1− v(2))S−2dv(2)

















S − 1 dv(2),
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S − 1 dv(2)










S(S − 1) dv(2)
=
w1
S(S − 1) +
2(1− v(2))S+1





The numerator is the difference between the buyer’s valuation and the expected second
lowest bid. The denominator accounts for the random chance that the buyer is able to
initiate the auction.















, if N = 1.





































(wN+1 − 2vN+1) (1− vN+1)
(S+1)−1



















(S + 1)((S + 1)− 1) +
2(1− vN+1)(S+1)+1









































































where (24) is from integration-by-parts of the preceding line as follows:Z 1
0
(wN+1vN+1 − v2N+1)(1− vN+1)(S+1)−2dvN+1
= (wN+1vN+1 − v2N+1) (−(1− vN+1)
(S+1)−1)






(wN+1 − 2vN+1) (1− vN+1)
(S+1)−1




(wN+1 − 2vN+1) (1− vN+1)
(S+1)−1
(S + 1)− 1 dvN+1,
and the term (25) is from integration-by-parts of the preceding line as follows:
∫ 1
0
(wN+1 − 2vN+1)(1− vN+1)
(S+1)−1
(S + 1)− 1 dvN+1
= (wN+1 − 2vN+1) (−(1− vN+1)
(S+1))








(S + 1)((S + 1)− 1)dvN+1
=
wN+1
(S + 1)((S + 1)− 1) +
2(1− vN+1)(S+1)+1






Propositions 3.4.6 and 3.4.8(RFA Expected Buyer Surplus and Bid Strategy) The
expected surplus to a buyer participating in the N th-to-last period of a PDSM alternating
auction sequence is













when N is odd and













when N is even.
For odd N (i.e., when the buyer is a bidder), the optimal bid strategy is bN (wN ) = wN .
Proof of Propositions 3.4.6 and 3.4.8
We first assume that there is only one auction in the sequence. Since it is a forward auction,





The expected surplus when N = 2 comes from initiating the auction in the first period
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2(1− v(2))S+1
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2
S(S − 1)(S + 1)

+ (B − 1)( w
B+1
1









+ (B − 1)( 1
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where (26) follows from the integration-by-parts of the preceding line as follows:
∫ 1
0
(w2v(2) − v2(2))(1− v(2))S−2dv(2)

















S − 1 dv(2),





S − 1 dv(2)










S(S − 1) dv(2)
=
w2
S(S − 1) +
2(1− v(2))S+1






Note that because these are sequential English auctions, for N = 1 the symmetric equilib-
rium strategy is to bid b1(w1) = w1 (Milgrom and Weber, 2000).
For the remaining sequences, we will assume that N is odd and prove by induction the
result when N + 1 is even. Then, we assume that N is even and prove the result when
N + 1 is odd.
Assume the expected surplus to a buyer participating in the N th-to-last period of a


















































































































where (28) follows from the integration-by-parts of the preceding expression as follows:
∫ 1
0
(wN+1v(2) − v2(2))(1− v(2))S−2dv(2)

















S − 1 dv(2)










S(S − 1) dv(2)
=
wN+1
S(S − 1) +
2(1− v(2))S+1





When N is an even number the result holds.
Now assume that the expected surplus to the buyer participating in the N th-to-last


























We obtain the first order conditions using Leibnitz’s rule. Although r is a function of wN+1,
for notational simplicity, we write r in the equation instead of writing it as a function of a
private valuation, which yields
dDN+1
dr
= (B − 1)(wN+1 − bN+1(r))(r)B−2 ≡ 0.
We solve for bN+1(r), which is
bN+1(r) = wN+1.
The right hand side of the bid function does not depend on r, so
bN+1(wN+1) = wN+1,
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which is positive. The derivative of the expected profit, D′N+1 > (<) 0 when bN+1(wN+1) <
(>) wN+1. Therefore, bN+1(wN+1) is the optimal equilibrium response for the bidder of
type wN+1 in the first of N + 1 auctions.
We substitute this optimal bid function into equation (29). Because the strategic buyer































= (B − 1)
∫ wN+1
0
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Hence for when N is an odd number, the result holds.¥
Proposition 3.4.7(FA Expected Buyer Surplus and Bid Strategy) The expected surplus








and the optimal equilibrium bid strategy is
bN (wN ) = wN .
Proof of Proposition 3.4.7
We first consider the last auction in the sequence (i.e., N = 1). Because this auction is an
English auction, the symmetric equilibrium bid strategy is to bid b1(w1) = w1 (Milgrom
and Weber, 2000), where w1 is the bidder’s valuation in this period. The expected surplus
to the buyer is the difference between his valuation and that of the second highest buyer
multiplied by the probability of that buyer actually having the second highest valuation of




(w1 − w(2))(B − 1)F (w(2))B−2f(w(2))dw(2)
= (B − 1)
∫ w1
0
(w1 − w(2))wB−2(2) dw(2)
= (B − 1)
∫ w1
0
(w1wB−2(2) − wB−1(2) )dw(2)
= (B − 1)
[w1wB−1(2)






= (B − 1)
[
wB1




= (B − 1)
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Assume the total expected surplus to the buyer competing in the N th-to-last period of









and the optimal bid strategy is
bN (wN ) = wN .
The expected surplus to the buyer of winning in the first of N +1 periods plus the expected














where r is the bidder type of the buyer.
We obtain the first order conditions using Leibnitz’s rule. Although r is a function of wN+1,
for notational simplicity, we write r in the equation instead of writing it as a function of a
private valuation, which yields
dDN+1
dr
= (B − 1)(wN+1 − bN+1(r))(r)B−2 ≡ 0.
We now solve for bN+1(r), which is
bN+1(r) = wN+1.
The right hand side of the bid function does not depend on r, so
bN+1(wN+1) = wN+1.
This function is nonnegative. The derivative of the expected profit, D′N+1(wN+1) > (<) 0
when bN+1(wN+1) < (>) wN+1. Therefore bN+1(wN+1) is the optimal equilibrium response
for the bidder of type wN+1 in the (N + 1)st-to-last auction in the sequence.
The above equation states that the buyer should bid as his true type.
We substitute this optimal bid function into (30) as the bid of the competitive buyer who
has type w(2). Because a strategic buyer will bid as his true type, wN+1, we replace r with
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DN (wN )f(wN )dwN
= (B − 1)
∫ wN+1
0










= (B − 1)
∫ wN+1
0







= (B − 1)
[wN+1wB−1(2)









= (B − 1)
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wBN+1







= (B − 1)
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where the first term,
wBN+1
B , is the expected surplus from winning the (N + 1)
st-to-last
auction and the second term is the total future expected surplus. ¥
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 3.5.1-3.5.6
In this appendix, we derive the inequalities in Table 1. These inequalities correspond to the
buyer and supplier preference of each auction design. Each inequality is simplified to give
the number of buyers needed to make the preference of an auction design hold.

















































































































































Proposition 3.5.1 (Buyer Reverse Auction vs. Forward Auction) A surplus-maximizing






Under the standard assumptions that S ≥ N +1 and N ≥ 2, when S ≥ 5 or both S ≥ 4
and N = 2, the buyer will prefer the reverse auction if and only if B > Nλ − 1 . When
S = N + 1 for N ∈ {2, 3}, the buyer will never prefer the reverse auction (because no B
exists for which B < Nλ − 1).
Proof of Proposition 3.5.1
Because the buyer looks to maximize expected surplus, he will be indifferent whenever
DRAN = D
FA
























By the same reasoning, the buyer will prefer a reverse auction if and only if DRAN > D
FA
N ,





















Because we divide by λ to simplify this expression with respect to B, the key now is
the sign of λ. If λ > 0, we can continue as above and conclude that the buyer will prefer a
reverse auction if and only if B > Nλ − 1. However, if λ < 0, the sign of the inequality will
switch when we divide both sides by λ, and we conclude that the buyer will prefer a reverse
auction if and only if B < Nλ − 1.
To determine the sign of λ, we use the standard assumptions that S ≥ N +1 and N ≥ 2
(so that competition exists in every auction).

































S − p + 1).
The terms in each summation decrease as the index increases since 12 − 2S+1 > 12 − 2S >
1
2 − 2S−2 > · · · > 12 − 2S−N+2 . So the lowest value in the summation will be 12 − 2S−N+2 . In
addition, the lowest value of S will yield the lowest value for each difference (i.e., 12− 2S−p+1).





























Each of the terms in the summation is positive (since 12 >
2
7) and the four terms outside
the summation are 412 − 26 − 25 − 24 − 23 = 2 − 11460 > 0; therefore, λ > 0 and the buyer will
prefer a reverse auction if and only if B > Nλ − 1.
Case 2: S = 4 and N = 2. If N = 2 then λ = (12 − 25) + (12 − 24) > 0. Therefore, in
this case the buyer will prefer a reverse auction whenever B > Nλ − 1.
Case 3: S = N + 1 and N ∈ {2, 3}. This case has two subcases. If S = 3 and N = 2,
then λ = (12− 24)+(12− 23) < 0. If S = 4 and N = 3, then λ = (12− 25)+(12− 24)+(12− 23) < 0.
Therefore, in this case the buyer will prefer a reverse auction if and only if B < Nλ − 1.
However, it is easy to show that in fact the buyer will never prefer a reverse auction in this
case. Since λ < 0, Nλ − 1 < 0 and it is impossible for B to be less than 1 in any auction. ¥
99
Proposition 3.5.2 (Buyer Reverse Auction vs. Alternating Auction) A surplus-maximizing
buyer will be indifferent between a sequence of reverse auctions and a sequence of alternating






















2 − 2S−2p , when N is odd.
Under the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and N ≥ 2, when S ≥ 6 or when
both S = 5 and N = 2 or N = 3, the buyer will prefer the reverse auction if and only if
B > N2(λ−ρ) − 1 . When S = N + 1 for N ∈ {2, 3, 4}, the buyer will never prefer the reverse
auction (because no B exists for which B < N2(λ−ρ) − 1). When S = 4 and N = 2 (the only
remaining case), the buyer again will never prefer the reverse auction.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.2
Because the buyer looks to maximize expected surplus, he will be indifferent whenever
DRAN = D
RFA












λ− ρ = N
2(B + 1)
(B + 1)(λ− ρ) = N
2

































2 − 2S−2p , when N is odd.
By the same reasoning, the buyer will prefer a reverse auction if and only if DRAN > D
RFA
N ,









λ− ρ > N
2(B + 1)
(B + 1)(λ− ρ) > N
2




Because we divide by λ − ρ to simplify this expression with respect to B, the key now
is the sign of (λ− ρ). If (λ− ρ) > 0, we can continue as above and conclude that the buyer
will prefer a reverse auction if and only if B > N2(λ−ρ) − 1. However, if (λ− ρ) < 0, the sign
of the inequality will switch when we divide both sides by (λ − ρ), and we conclude that
the buyer will prefer a reverse auction if and only if B < N2(λ−ρ) − 1.
To determine the sign of (λ− ρ), we use the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and
N ≥ 2 (so that competition exists in every auction). We begin with the case that N is even.






























































S − 2p + 1).
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This makes (λ− ρ) equivalent to
λ− ρ = (1
2
− 2
























S − 2p + 1).
The pth term in the second summation is exactly equal to the (2p)th term in the first
summation. Therefore, λ− ρ simplifies to
λ− ρ = (1
2
− 2


















The terms in each summation decrease as the index increases since 12 − 2S > 12 − 2S−2 >
1
2 − 2S−4 > . . . > 12 − 2S−N+6 . So the lowest value in the summation will be 12 − 2S−N+6 . In
addition, the lowest value of S will yield the lowest value for each difference (i.e., 12 − 2S−2p).
Since S ≥ N + 1,
























Each of the terms in the summation is positive (since 12 >
2
9) and the three terms outside
the summation are 32 − 23 − 25 − 27 = 32 − 142105 > 0; therefore, λ − ρ > 0 and the buyer will
prefer a reverse auction if and only if B > N2(λ−ρ) − 1.


























This makes (λ− ρ) equivalent to
λ− ρ = (1
2
− 2


























The terms of the first summation equal those of the second summation when p in the first
summation is odd which means the first summation has twice as many terms as the second
summation. Therefore, λ− ρ simplifies to
λ− ρ = (1
2
− 2


















The terms in each summation decrease as the index increases since 12 − 2S > 12 − 2S−2 >
1
2 − 2S−4 > . . . . In addition, the lowest value of S will yield the lowest value for each
difference (i.e., 12 − 2S−2p). Since S ≥ N + 1, we have
























Each of the terms in the summation is positive (since 12 >
2
9) and the three terms outside
the summation are 32 − 23 − 25 − 27 = 32 − 142105 > 0; therefore, λ − ρ > 0 and the buyer will
prefer a reverse auction if and only if B > N2(λ−ρ) − 1.
Case 2: S = 5 and N ∈ {2, 3}. This case has two subcases. If N = 2 then λ − ρ =
1
2 − 25 > 0. If N = 3 then λ− ρ = (12 − 26) + (12 − 24) > 0. In this case the buyer will prefer a
reverse auction whenever B > N2(λ−ρ) − 1.
Case 3: S = N + 1 and N ∈ {2, 3, 4}. This case has three subcases. If S = 3 and
N = 2, then λ− ρ = 12 − 23 < 0. If S = 4 and N = 3, then λ− ρ = (12 − 25) + (12 − 23) < 0.
If S = 5 and N = 4, then λ = (12 − 25) + (12 − 23) < 0. Therefore, in this case the buyer will
prefer a reverse auction if and only if B < N2(λ−ρ) − 1. However, it is easy to show that in
fact the buyer will never prefer a reverse auction in this case. Since λ−ρ < 0, N2(λ−ρ)−1 < 0
and it is impossible for B to be less than 1 in any auction.
Case 4: S = 4 and N = 2. This is the only remaining case for which S ≥ N ≥ 2. In
this case, λ − ρ = 12 − 24 = 0, so we cannot divide by λ − ρ. Therefore, we return to the
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λ− ρ > N
2(B + 1)
Since both B and N must be positive, it is impossible for this to occur; therefore, the buyer
will never prefer a reverse auction in this case. ¥
Proposition 3.5.3 (Buyer Forward Auction vs. Alternating Auction) A surplus-
maximizing buyer will be indifferent between a sequence of forward auctions and a sequence















2 − 2S−2p , when N is odd.
Under the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and N ≥ 2, when S ≥ 5 or when both
S = 4 and N = 2, the buyer will prefer the forward auction if and only if B < N2ρ − 1.
When S = N + 1 for N ∈ {2, 3}, the buyer will prefer the forward auction because for any
B, N2(B+1) > ρ.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.3























































2 − 2S−2p , when N is odd.
By the same reasoning, the buyer will prefer a forward auction if and only if DFAN > D
RFA
N ,



























Because we divide by ρ to simplify this expression with respect to B, the key now is
the sign of ρ. If ρ > 0, we can continue as above and conclude that the buyer will prefer
a forward auction if and only if B < N2ρ − 1. However, if ρ < 0, the sign of the inequality
will switch when we divide both sides by ρ, and we conclude that the buyer will prefer a
forward auction if and only if B > N2ρ − 1.
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To determine the sign of ρ, we use the standard assumptions that S ≥ N +1 and N ≥ 2
(so that competition exists in every auction). We begin with the case that N is even.

























S − 2p + 1).
The terms in the summation decrease as the index increases since 12 − 2S+1 > 12 − 2S >
1
2 − 2S−2 > · · · > 12 − 2S−N+7 . So the lowest value in the summation will be 12 − 2S−N+7 . In
addition, the lowest value of S will yield the lowest value for each difference (i.e., 12− 2S−p+1).



















Each of the terms in the summation is positive (since 12 >
2
8) and the two terms outside
the summation are 12 +
1
2 − 24 − 26 = 12 − 13 > 0; therefore, ρ > 0 and the buyer will prefer a
forward auction if and only if B < N2ρ − 1.


























The terms in the summation decrease as the index increases since 12 − 2S+1 > 12 − 2S >
1
2 − 2S−2 > · · · > 12 − 2S−N+7 . So the lowest value in the summation will be 12 − 2S−N+7 . In
addition, the lowest value of S will yield the lowest value for each difference (i.e., 12− 2S−p+1).



















Each of the terms in the summation is positive (since 12 >
2
8) and the two terms outside
the summation are 12 +
1
2 − 24 − 26 = 12 − 13 > 0; therefore, ρ > 0 and the buyer will prefer a
forward auction if and only if B < N2ρ − 1.
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Case 2: S = 4 and N = 2. If N = 2 then ρ = 12 − 25 > 0. In this case the buyer will
prefer a forward auction whenever B < N2ρ − 1.
Case 3: S = N + 1 and N ∈ {2, 3}. This case has two subcases. If S = 3 and N = 2,
then ρ = 12 − 24 = 0. If S = 4 and N = 3, then ρ = 12 − 24 = 0. Therefore, we cannot divide
by ρ. We return to the initial inequality, which states that the buyer will prefer the forward






























Since both B and N must be positive, this inequality must hold; therefore, the buyer will
prefer a forward auction in this case for any value of B. ¥





















































S − q ))
1












































S − 2q + 1))
1









S − 2q ))
1









S − 2q + 1))
1









S − 2q ))
1
(S − 2p)(S − 2p− 1) when N is odd.
Supplier Preference
In this section, we compare the N -period expected profit to the supplier under each auction
sequence.
Proposition 3.5.4(Supplier Reverse Auction vs. Forward Auction) A profit-maximizing
















S − q ))
1
S − p− 1 ,
Under the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and N ≥ 2, we have that the buyer
will prefer the reverse auction to the forward auction if and only if B > 1+γ1−γ .
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Proof of Proposition 3.5.4
Because the supplier looks to maximize expected profit, she will be indifferent whenever
PRAN = P
FA
N . As shown above, this is equivalent to































































































(S −N + 1) + (S + 1)(N − 1)










S −N + 1 + SN + N − S − 1





























S − q ))
1































S − 1) · · · (
S −N + 1
S −N )
1










Therefore, using the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and N ≥ 2, α > 0 and we can
divide both sides of the equality by 1 + αS as follows:
2SN













(S + 1)(S −N + 1)(1 + αS) + 1 =
B − 1
B + 1
Simplifying this equality with respect to B and making the substitution
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γB + γ = B − 1
γ + 1 = B − γB
1 + γ
1− γ = B.
By the same reasoning, the supplier prefers the reverse auction to the forward auction
when the expected profit of the reverse auction exceeds that of the forward auction. This
is expressed as follows:































































































(S −N + 1) + (S + 1)(N − 1)










S −N + 1 + SN + N − S − 1





















As shown above, α = N−1S . Using the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and N ≥ 2,
α > 0 and we can divide both sides of the inequality by 1 + αS without switching the sign
as follows:
2SN



















Simplifying this inequality with respect to B and making the substitution
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γB + γ > B − 1,
γ + 1 > B − γB,
1 + γ
1− γ > B.
Our standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and N ≥ 2 require that γ > 1, therefore when
we divide by 1 − γ, the inequality switches. Therefore, we have that the supplier prefers
the reverse auction to the forward auction when B > 1+γ1−γ . ¥
Proposition 3.5.5 (Supplier Reverse Auction vs. Alternating Auction) A profit-








S(S−N+1)(S − 1)− κ(S − 1) + 12 + 12τ(S − 1)















q=0(1− 1S−2q )) 1S−2p−2 , when N is odd















q=0(1− 1S−2q )) 1(S−2p)(S−2p−1) , when N is odd
0, when N = 2.
Under the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and N ≥ 2, the buyer will prefer the
reverse auction to the alternating auction if and only if B > 1+%1−% .
Proof of Proposition 3.5.5




N . As shown above, this is equivalent to













































(N − 1)(S − 1)











(N − 1)(S − 1)












(N − 1)(S − 1)









τ(S − 1)− 1
2
τ(S − 1),
(N − 1)(S − 1)






τ(S − 1) = B − 1
B + 1
(1 + τ(S − 1)),
2(N − 1)(S − 1)
S(S −N + 1) − 2κ(S − 1) + 1 + τ(S − 1) =
B − 1
B + 1
(1 + τ(S − 1)).
Because τ ≥ 0 for every S and N using the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and





S(S−N+1) − 2κ(S − 1)
1 + τ(S − 1) + 1.








B − 1 = %B + %




By the same reasoning, the supplier prefers the reverse auction to the alternating auction
when the expected profit of the reverse auction exceeds that of the alternating auction. This
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is expressed as follows:













































(N − 1)(S − 1)











(N − 1)(S − 1)












(N − 1)(S − 1)









τ(S − 1)− 1
2
τ(S − 1),
(N − 1)(S − 1)






τ(S − 1) > B − 1
B + 1
(1 + τ(S − 1)),
2(N − 1)(S − 1)
S(S −N + 1) − 2κ(S − 1) + 1 + τ(S − 1) >
B − 1
B + 1
(1 + τ(S − 1)).
Because τ ≥ 0 for every S and N using the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and





S(S−N+1) − 2κ(S − 1)
1 + τ(S − 1) + 1.








B − 1 < %B + %
B − %B < % + 1
B(1− %) < % + 1
To finish simplifying this inequality with respect to B we divide by 1 − % so we must
determine the sign of 1− %. If 1− % > 0, we can continue as above and conclude that the
buyer will prefer a reverse auction if and only if B < 1+%1−% . However, if 1 − % < 0, the sign
of the inequality will switch when we divide both sides by 1− %, and we conclude that the
buyer will prefer a reverse auction if and only if B > 1+%1−% .
To determine the sign of 1− %, we determine whether % > 1 as follows:
% =
2(N−1)(S−1)
S(S−N+1) − 2κ(S − 1)
1 + τ(S − 1) + 1
=
2(N − 1)(S − 1)
S(S −N + 1)(1 + τ(S − 1)) −
2κ(S − 1)
1 + τ(S − 1) + 1.
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So % > 1 when
2(N − 1)(S − 1)
S(S −N + 1)(1 + τ(S − 1)) −
2κ(S − 1)
1 + τ(S − 1) > 0
N − 1
S(S −N + 1) − κ > 0.
Because κ depends on whether N is even or odd, we consider this inequality for both cases
of N .
Case 1: N is even. When N is even, % > 1 when
N − 1








S − 2q + 1))
1
(S − 2p)(S − 2p + 1) > 0,
which is true when
N − 1








S − 2q + 1))
1
(S − 2p)(S − 2p + 1) . (27)









S − 2q + 1))
1









(S − 2p)(S − 2p + 1) ,
because each term in the product is less than one. We further simplify the summation by
























S − 2q + 1))
1





(S − 2p)(S − 2p + 1) .











S − 2p +
−1
S − 2p + 1).






S − 2p + 1 +
1
S − 2p ) = (
−1
S − 1 +
1
S − 2) + (
−1
S − 3 +
1
S − 4) + (
−1
S − 5 +
1
S − 6)
+ . . . + (
−1
S −N + 5 +
1
S −N + 4) + (
−1
S −N + 3 +
1
S −N + 2).






S − 2p + 1 +
1
S − 2p ) =
−1
S − 1 + (
1
S − 2 −
1
S − 3) + (
1
S − 4 −
1
S − 5) + (
1
S − 6
− . . .− 1
S −N + 5) + (
1
S −N + 4 −
1
S −N + 3) +
1
S −N + 2 .
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Because all of the terms grouped in a set of parenthesis are of the form 1x− 1x−1 = (x−1)−xx(x−1) =
−1






S − 2p + 1 +
1
S − 2p ) <
−1
S − 1 +
1
S −N + 2 .
The right side of this inequality simplifies as follows:
−1
S − 1 +
1
S −N + 2 =
−(S −N + 2) + (S − 1)
(S − 1)(S −N + 2)
=
N − 3
(S − 1)(S −N + 2) .
It is true that
N − 3
(S − 1)(S −N + 2) ≤
N − 3
S(S −N + 1) (28)
because (S − 1)(S −N + 2) ≥ S(S −N + 1) for all N ≥ 2, as follows:
(S − 1)(S −N + 2)− S(S −N + 1) = (S2 − S −NS + N + 2S − 2)− (S2 −NS + S)
= N − 2.
Since the sequence must include at least two auctions (N ≥ 2), the difference is always
nonnegative and the inequality holds. We compare the right side of the inequality on line
(28) to the left side of the inequality on line (27) to obtain
N − 1
S(S −N + 1) >
N − 3
S(S −N + 1) ,
because N − 1 > N − 3. By putting all of these inequalities and equations together, we
conclude that the inequality on line (27) holds. Specifically,
N − 1








S − 2q + 1))
1
(S − 2p)(S − 2p + 1) > 0.
Therefore, when N is even, % > 1 and the supplier prefers the reverse auction to the
alternating auction if and only if B > 1+%1−% .
We now consider the case when N is odd.
Case 2: N is odd. In this case, using κ when N is odd, % > 1 when
N − 1








S − 2q ))
1
(S − 2p)(S − 2p− 1) > 0,
which occurs when
N − 1








S − 2q ))
1
(S − 2p)(S − 2p− 1) . (29)
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S − 2q − 1
S − 2q ))
1









(S − 2p)(S − 2p− 1) ,
because each term in the product is less than one. We further simplify the summation by























S − 2q − 1
S − 2q ))
1





(S − 2p)(S − 2p− 1) .











S − 2p +
1
S − 2p− 1).






S − 2p +
1





S − 1) + (
−1
S − 2 +
1
S − 3) + (
−1
S − 4 +
1
S − 5)
+ . . . + (
−1
S −N + 5 +
1
S −N + 4) + (
−1
S −N + 3 +
1
S −N + 2).






S − 2p +
1





S − 1 +
−1
S − 2) + (
1
S − 3 +
−1
S − 4) + (
1
S − 5
+ . . . +
−1
S −N + 5) + (
1
S −N + 4 +
−1
S −N + 3) +
1
S −N + 2 .
Because all of the terms grouped in a set of parenthesis are of the form 1x− 1x−1 = (x−1)−xx(x−1) =
−1






S − 2p +
1





S −N + 2 .





S −N + 2 =
−(S −N + 2) + S
S(S −N + 2)
=
N − 2
S(S −N + 2) .
It is true that
N − 2
S(S −N + 2) ≤
N − 2
S(S −N + 1) (30)
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because (S −N + 2) > (S −N + 1). We compare the right side of the inequality on line
(30) to the left side of the inequality on line (29) to obtain
N − 1
S(S −N + 1) >
N − 2
S(S −N + 1) ,
because N − 1 > N − 2. By putting all of these inequalities and equations together, we
conclude that the inequality on line (29) holds. Specifically,
N − 1








S − 2q ))
1
(S − 2p)(S − 2p− 1) .
Therefore, when N is odd, % > 1 and the supplier prefers the reverse auction to the
alternating auction if and only if B > 1+%1−% . ¥
Proposition 3.5.6 (Supplier Forward Auction vs. Alternating Auction) A profit-








S+1 + 2κS(S − 1)









S − q ))
1















q=0(1− 1S−2q )) 1S−2p−2 , when N is odd















q=0(1− 1S−2q )) 1(S−2p)(S−2p−1) , when N is odd.
0, when N = 2.
Under the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and N ≥ 2, the supplier will prefer
the forward auction to the alternating auction if and only if B > 1+η1−η .
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Proof of Proposition 3.5.6








S+1 + 2κS(S − 1)









S − q ))
1















q=0(1− 1S−2q )) 1S−2p−2 , when N is odd















q=0(1− 1S−2q )) 1(S−2p)(S−2p−1) , when N is odd.
0, when N = 2.
Under the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and N ≥ 2, the supplier will prefer
the forward auction to the alternating auction if and only if B > 1+η1−η .
Proof of Proposition 3.5.6




N . This is equivalent to
















































































































+ κS(S − 1),
We next divide both sides of the equality by (α − τ)S(S − 1) − 1 and later prove that it








+ κS(S − 1)






+ κS(S − 1)









+ 2κS(S − 1)
(α− τ)S(S − 1)− 1 + 1.









ηB + η = B − 1












S − q ))
1















q=0(1− 1S−2q )) 1S−2p−2 , when N is odd
















q=0(1− 1S−2q )) 1(S−2p)(S−2p−1) , when N is odd.
0, when N = 2.








S − q ))
1































S − 1) · · · (
S −N + 1
S −N )
1










By the same reasoning, the supplier prefers the forward auction to the alternating auc-
tion when the expected profit of the forward auction exceeds that of the alternating auction.
This is expressed as follows:
















































































































+ κS(S − 1).
We next divide both sides of the inequality by (α− τ)S(S − 1)− 1 and later prove that it








+ κS(S − 1)






+ κS(S − 1)









+ 2κS(S − 1)
(α− τ)S(S − 1)− 1 + 1.
If (α− τ)S(S − 1)− 1 is negative, then the sign of the inequality switches. We later prove
whether (α− τ)S(S − 1)− 1 is positive or negative.
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B − 1 > ηB + η,




where α, κ, and τ are as defined above.
Because we divide by 1 − η to simplify this expression with respect to B, the key now
is determining the sign of 1− η. If 1− η > 0, we can continue as above and conclude that
the supplier will prefer a forward auction if and only if B > 1+η1−η . However, if 1− η < 0, the
sign of the inequality will switch when we divide both sides by 1− η, and we conclude that
the supplier will prefer a forward auction if and only if B < 1+η1−η .
To determine the sign of 1 − η, since the numerator of 1 − η is positive, we determine
whether the denominator is also positive. Specifically, we will check the sign of (α−τ)S(S−
1)− 1.
Using the simplification of α as shown in (31), the left side of this inequality can be
expressed as
(α− τ)S(S − 1)− 1 = (N − 1
S
− τ)S(S − 1)− 1
=
(N − 1)S(S − 1)
S
− (τ)S(S − 1)− 1
= (N − 1)(S − 1)− (τ)S(S − 1)− 1
= NS − S −N + 1− (τ)S(S − 1)− 1
= NS − S −N − (τ)S(S − 1).
Therefore, to determine if the denominator of 1− η is positive, we need to check if NS −
S −N > (τ)S(S − 1), which can also be stated as NS−S−NS(S−1) > τ .
Because τ depends on whether N is even or odd, we consider this inequality for both
cases of N . We will use the standard assumptions that S ≥ N + 1 and N ≥ 2.
Case 1: N = 2. When N = 2, τ = 0 and NS−S−NS(S−1) =
S−2
S(S−1) > 0 since S ≥ N + 1 = 3.
In this case NS−S−NS(S−1) > τ and 1− η > 0. Therefore, we can conclude that the supplier will
prefer a forward auction if and only if B > 1+η1−η .
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Case 2: N is even and N ≥ 4. When N is even and N ≥ 4, we determine if the
inequality NS−S−NS(S−1) > τ is valid for any S when N ≥ 4. In this case, NS−S−NS(S−1) > τ becomes
NS − S −N








S − 2q + 1))
1
S − 2p− 1 . (32)
The left side of the inequality in (32) can be expressed as
NS − S −N
S(S − 1) =
N − 1










S − 1(N − 2)
because S > N . Therefore,
NS − S −N
S(S − 1) >
1
S − 1(N − 2). (33)








S − 2q + 1))
1















S − 3) · · · (
S −N + 2
S −N + 3)(
1
S −N + 1).








S − 2q + 1))
1















S − 5) · · · (
S −N + 2
S −N + 1)

.














S − 5) · · · (
S −N + 2


























S − 2q − 1)). (34)
We combine (33) and (34), to show that the inequality in (32) holds if
NS − S −N
S(S − 1) >
1











S − 2q − 1)) = τ.
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This is also expressed as









S − 2q − 1)).
We now show that the inequality in (32) holds if the average term of the summation is less
than two. Dividing both sides by N−22 produces
2























S − 2q − 1)).
The term on the right side of the inequality is an average since there are N−22 terms in the
summation.











S as the average of the T
p
S for
p = 1, 2, . . . , N−22 .
We know that T p+1S > T
p
S for p ≥ 1 since T p+1S = (T pS)( S−2pS−2p−1) and S−2pS−2p−1 > 1.
Therefore, T pS is increasing in p.
An increase in the number of periods, N , for any given S will increase the average as






























Because T pS is increasing in p, T
N
2
S is greater than each T
p


































− 1)) = AN,S .
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Therefore, given any S, the average is increasing with an increase in N and τ will be greatest
(because AN,S will be largest) when N is as close to S as possible. If S is even, this will be
when N = S− 2; if S is odd, it will be when N = S− 1. We now show that as N increases,
AN,S continues to remain less than two. We consider the two subcases when S is even or
odd.
Subcase 1: S is odd. In this case, the lowest value of S that satisfies the assumption


















In this case NS−S−NS(S−1) > τ and 1− η > 0. Therefore, we can conclude that the supplier will
prefer a forward auction if and only if B > 1+η1−η .


















S − 2q − 1))

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(S + 2)− 2q



























S −N + 2
S −N + 1

.
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Therefore, AN,N+1 < 2 for all even N ≥ 4. Since S = N + 1 in this case, we can
equivalently say AS−1,S < 2 for all odd S ≥ 5. We conclude that in this case NS−S−NS(S−1) > τ
and 1− η > 0. Therefore, the supplier will prefer a forward auction if and only if B > 1+η1−η .
We now prove by induction the case when S is even.
Subcase 2: S is even. In this case, the lowest value of S that satisfies the assumption


















In this case NS−S−NS(S−1) > τ and 1− η > 0. Therefore, we can conclude that the supplier will
prefer a forward auction if and only if B > 1+η1−η .







































(S + 2)− 2q



























S −N + 2
S −N + 1

.
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S −N + 2
S −N + 1

.
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Therefore, AN,N+2 < 2 for all even N ≥ 4. Since S = N +2 in this case, we can equivalently
say AS−2,S < 2 for all even S ≥ 6. We conclude that in this case NS−S−NS(S−1) > τ and 1−η > 0.
Therefore, the supplier will prefer a forward auction if and only if B > 1+η1−η .
Case 3: N is odd and N ≥ 3. When N is odd and N ≥ 3, we determine if the
inequality NS−S−NS(S−1) > τ is valid for any S when N ≥ 3. In this case, NS−S−NS(S−1) > τ becomes
NS − S −N








S − 2q − 1
S − 2q ))
1
S − 2p− 2 . (35)
We begin by showing this inequality to hold for N = 3 and S = 4 and N = 3 and S = 6
then continue with the proof for N ≥ 5 and S ≥ 6. When N = 3 and S = 4, the inequality
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in (35) becomes
NS − S −N







S − 2q − 1
S − 2q ))
1















When N = 3 and S = 5, the inequality in (35) becomes
NS − S −N







S − 2q ))
1















We now continue with the proof for N ≥ 5 and S ≥ 6. The left side of the inequality in
(35) can be expressed as
NS − S −N
S(S − 1) =
N − 1







S − 1). (36)








S − 2q − 1
S − 2q ))
1


















S − 2) · · · (
S −N + 2
S −N + 3)(
1
S −N + 1).








S − 2q − 1
S − 2q ))
1















S − 4) · · · (
S −N + 2
S −N + 1)

.














S − 4) · · · (
S −N + 2
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S as the average of the R
p
S for
p = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N−32 .
We know that Rp+1S > R
p
S for p ≥ 0 since Rp+1S = (RpS)(S−2p−1S−2p−2) and S−2p−1S−2p−2 > 1.
Therefore, RpS is increasing in p.
































Because RpS is increasing in p, R
N−1
2
S is greater than each R
p
























































Therefore, given any S, MN,S is increasing with an increase in N and τ will be greatest
(because MN,S will be largest) when N is as close to S as possible. If S is even, this will
be when N = S − 1; if S is odd, it will be when N = S − 2. We now prove by induction
that MS−1,S <
2(S+1)
S+2 for all S ≥ 6. We consider the two subcases when S is even or odd.









S − 2q − 1




























Now, suppose that MS−2,S <
2(S+1)
S+2 for some odd S ≥ 7.
MS,S+2 =
2































(S + 2)− 2q − 1




























S −N + 2
S −N + 1

.
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S −N + 2
S −N + 1

.
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S − 2q − 1






















(N − 1)(S + 1)
S(S + 2)
.
Now we prove that τ < NS−N−SS(S−1) by showing
τ <
(N − 1)(S + 1)
S(S + 2)
<
NS −N − S
S(S − 1) .
We show that (N−1)(S+1)S(S+2) <
NS−N−S
S(S−1) noting that NS −N − S = (N − 1)(S − 1)− 1.
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So,
(N − 1)(S + 1)
S(S + 2)
<
NS −N − S
S(S − 1)
⇔ (N − 1)(S + 1)
S(S + 2)
<
(N − 1)(S − 1)− 1
S(S − 1)
⇔ (N − 1)(S + 1)
S + 2
<
(N − 1)(S − 1)− 1
S − 1
⇔ (N − 1)(S + 1)(S − 1) < (N − 1)(S − 1)(S + 2)− (S + 2)
⇔ 0 < (N − 1)(S − 1)((S + 2)− (S + 1))− (S + 2)
⇔ S + 2 < (N − 1)(S − 1)
⇔ S + 2
S − 1 < N − 1.
Since S+2S−1 < 2 for all S ≥ 7 and since N ≥ 5 in this case, this inequality holds. We
conclude that in this case NS−S−NS(S−1) > τ and 1− η > 0. Therefore, for N ≥ 5, the inequality
in (35) holds. Therefore, the supplier will prefer a forward auction if and only if B > 1+η1−η .
We now prove by induction that MS−1,S <
2(S+1)
S+2 for all S ≥ 6 when S is even.
Subcase 2: S is even. In this case, S = N +1. We begin with S = 6. The corresponding









S − 2q − 1



























Now, suppose that MS−1,S <
2(S+1)
S+2 for some even S ≥ 6.
MS+1,S+2 = (
2

































(S + 2)− 2q − 1




























S −N + 2
S −N + 1

.
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S −N + 2
S −N + 1

.
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S − 2q − 1




































































































































































S − 2q − 1






















(N − 1)(S + 1)
S(S + 2)
.
Now we prove that τ < NS−N−SS(S−1) by showing
τ <
(N − 1)(S + 1)
S(S + 2)
<
NS −N − S
S(S − 1) .
We show that (N−1)(S+1)S(S+2) <
NS−N−S
S(S−1) noting that NS −N − S = (N − 1)(S − 1)− 1.
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So,
(N − 1)(S + 1)
S(S + 2)
<
NS −N − S
S(S − 1)
⇔ (N − 1)(S + 1)
S(S + 2)
<
(N − 1)(S − 1)− 1
S(S − 1)
⇔ (N − 1)(S + 1)
S + 2
<
(N − 1)(S − 1)− 1
S − 1
⇔ (N − 1)(S + 1)(S − 1) < (N − 1)(S − 1)(S + 2)− (S + 2)
⇔ 0 < (N − 1)(S − 1)((S + 2)− (S + 1))− (S + 2)
⇔ S + 2 < (N − 1)(S − 1)
⇔ S + 2
S − 1 < N − 1.
Since S+2S−1 < 2 for all S ≥ 6 and since N ≥ 5 in this case, this inequality holds. We
conclude that in this case NS−S−NS(S−1) > τ and 1− η > 0. Therefore, for N ≥ 5, the inequality




EQUILIBRIUM FIGURES AND TABLES
In this appendix, we consider the regions that constitute an equilibrium auction design.
Figure 14: Supplier FA/RFA Indifference Surface with Preference: FA above; RFA below
Figure 15: Supplier RA/RFA Indifference Surface with Preference: RA below; RFA above
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Figure 16: Supplier RA/FA Indifference Surface with Preference: RA below; FA above
Figure 17: Mesh Supplier FA/RFA and Smooth RA/FA Indifference Surfaces
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Figure 18: Mesh Supplier RA/RFA and Smooth RA/FA Indifference Surfaces
Figure 19: Buyer FA/RFA Indifference Surface with Preference: FA below; RFA above
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Figure 20: Buyer RA/RFA Indifference Surface with Preference: RA above; RFA below
Figure 21: Buyer RA/FA Indifference Surface with Preference: RA above; FA below
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Figure 22: Mesh Buyer FA/RFA and Smooth RA/FA Indifference Surfaces
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Figure 23: Mesh Buyer RA/RFA and Smooth RA/FA Indifference Surfaces
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Figure 24: Three Buyer Indifference Surfaces
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Figure 25: All Six Indifference Surfaces
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Figure 26: Indifference Surfaces - Different View
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Figure 27: Table of Difference between Supplier RA/FA and FA/RFA Indifference Surfaces
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Figure 28: Tables of Difference between Supplier Indifference Surfaces
145
Figure 29: Table of Difference between Buyer Indifference Surfaces
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Figure 30: Table of Difference between Buyer RA/RFA AND FA/RFA Indifference Surfaces
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Figure 31: Tables of Difference between Supplier and Buyer RA/RFA and FA/RFA Indif-
ference Surfaces
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Figure 32: Tables of Difference between Supplier and Buyer Indifference Surfaces
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Figure 33: Tables of Difference between Supplier and Buyer Indifference Surfaces
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Figure 34: Table of Difference between Supplier RA/FA and Buyer RA/RFA Indifference
Surfaces
151
Figure 35: Tables of Difference between Supplier and Buyer Indifference Surfaces
152
Figure 36: Table of Expected Profit to Supplier from RA and FA Auction
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Figure 37: Table of Expected Surplus to Buyer from RA and FA Auction
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In this appendix, we provide the benefit of an increase in the number of periods to the
supplier or buyer for the PDSM RA, FA, and RFA auction designs.
Proposition 3.5.8(Preference of Sequence Length) The effect of increasing the number
of auction periods is shown in Table 4 of Chapter 3.5.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.8
To determine the benefit of an increase in the number of periods to the supplier or buyer
for the PDSM RA, FA, and RFA auction designs, we compute the expected value of the
difference in expected return between the sequence with N periods and the sequence with
N + 1 periods. The valuations are equal in expectation, (i.e., E[vN+1] = E[vN ]).
PDSM Reverse Auction







S(S −N + 1)
The benefit of each additional period to the expected supplier profit is as follows:









(N + 1)− 1







dvN ]− N − 1





S(S −N + 1)
=
N(S −N + 1)− (N − 1)(S −N)
S(S −N)(S −N + 1)
=
NS −N2 + N − [NS − S −N2 + N ]
S(S −N)(S −N + 1)
=
1
(S −N)(S −N + 1) .
Note that the benefit of an additional period is positive. Therefore the expected profit
increases with an increase in N .
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B , when N > 1
wN− 2S+1
B , when N = 1.
We take the difference between a sequence with N periods and a sequence with N + 1
periods. The benefit from the expected surplus of an additional period is as follows:




































Note that the benefit of an additional period is positive for S −N > 3 and non-positive
for S − N ≤ 3. Therefore the expected surplus may increase or decrease with an increase
in N depending on the difference between N and S.
PDSM Forward Auction













S − q ))
B−1
B+1 − 12
S − p− 1 .
The benefit of an additional period is as follows:


























S − 1) · · · (1−
1
S −N + 1)

B − 3
































S − 2) · · · (
S −N + 1
S −N + 2)(
S −N
S −N + 1)

B − 3
2(B + 1)(S −N + 1) .
Note that the benefit of an additional period is negative for B = 2 and non-negative for
B ≥ 3.
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The benefit of an additional period to the expected buyer surplus is as follows:




























Note that the benefit of an additional period for the expected surplus is positive. There-
fore the expected surplus increases with an increase in N .
PDSM Alternating Auction
The expected profit for a supplier participating in the N th-to-last period of a PDSM alter-















S − 2q ))

1






S − 2p− 2

,























S − 2p− 1

.
Because we have fixed the auction type in the last period as a forward auction, we
increase the number of periods by two. An increase in the number of periods is given by
the difference between PN+2 and PN where PN+2 is the expected profit with N +2 periods.
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When N + 2 is even, the benefit of this increase is as follows:














S − 2q + 1)

1





















S − 2q + 1)

1




S −N − 1

.
When N+2 is odd, the benefit of an increase in the number of periods is similar (differing
in the first product term) and is given as follows:













S − 2q )

1




















S − 2q )

1




S −N − 1

.
Note that when N + 2 is even or odd an increase in the number of periods increases
the expected profit when B ≥ 3. When B = 2, an increase in the number of periods has a
non-increasing affect on expected profit as follows:
1




S −N − 1 =
1





S −N − 1
=
5S − 5N − S2 −N2 + 2SN − 6
(S −N)(S −N − 1)(S −N + 1) .
which is ≤ 0 when
S2 + N2 − 2SN + 6
5S − 5N ≥ 1
(S −N)(S −N) + 6





5(S −N) ≥ 1
which holds since S −N ≥ 1.
The expected surplus for a buyer participating in the N th-to-last period of a PDSM
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Because we have fixed the auction type in the last period as a forward auction, we
increase the number of periods by two. An increase in the number of periods is given by
the expected value of the difference between DN+2 and DN where DN+2 is the expected
surplus with N + 2 periods. When N + 2 is even, the benefit of this increase is as follows:




















































(S −N + 1)(S −N + 2) +
1
2B(B + 1)
When N + 2 is odd, the benefit of an increase is the same as shown in the following:




















































(S −N + 1)(S −N + 2) +
1
2B(B + 1)
Note that both when N + 2 is even or odd an increase in the number of periods increases





EXPECTED VALUE OF INFORMATION
In this appendix, we calculate the expected value of learning the valuation in the last period.
We analyze two cases: when the decision to learn the last-period valuation is made before
the second-to-last valuation v2 is known, and when the decision is made after v2 is known.
We only consider these two models because the bid strategy of the buyer in the 2nd-to-last
period does not depend on his private valuation in the last period; whereas, the bid strategy
of the supplier does.
Proposition 3.5.9(Expected Value of Information) For the reverse auction, the ex-
pected value to the supplier of knowing her valuation in the last period after choosing to
participate in a two-period auction after (EV IA) and before (EV IB) learning her valuation
in the 2nd-to-last period are as follows:

















(1− v2 + 1




















S − 1 − v2 −
W











(1− v2 + 1





(1−W )(S−1)(S−i)+1 − 1


















(1− v2 + 1


























+ (1− v2)(S − 1)]
S
S−1+1

















(1− v2 + 1






+ (1− v2)(S − 1)](S−i)+
1
S−1





















S − 1 − v2 −
1− [ 1
S
− v2(S − 1)]
1
S−1
S − 1 + v2[1− [
1
S



















(1− v2 + 1







− v2(S − 1)](S−i)+
1
S−1 − 1




















(1− v2 + 1













For the alternating auction, the expected value to the supplier of knowing her valuation
in the last period after choosing to participate in a two-period auction after (EV IA) and
before (EV IB) learning her valuation in the 2nd-to-last period are as follows:













































































Y − Y 2
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Proof of Proposition 3.5.8
Reverse Auction
We now prove that the expected profit to the supplier when the private valuation in the last
period is fixed but unknown is as above. In equilibrium, the suppliers will use the optimal
bid strategy derived in Proposition 3.4.1 (i.e., b(v2) = v2 + 1S(S−1)).
Using this optimal bid strategy of the suppliers, we solve for the expected profit,
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(1− v(2))S−1(v(2) + 1





































(x− v1)(S − 2)(1− F (x))S−3f(x)dx














(x− v1)(S − 2)(1− x)S−3dx













We obtain the first order conditions using Leibnitz’s rule with respect to the type, r, in
the 2nd-to-last period where r is a function of v2 and v1, we have
dP2(v2, v1)
dr
= −[(r + 1
S(S − 1) − v2) ∗ (S − 1)(1− r)
S−2] + (1− v1)S−1(1− r)S−2 ≡ 0
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We solve for the type, r as follows:
(r +
1
S(S − 1) − v2)(S − 1)(1− r)
S−2 = (1− v1)S−1(1− r)S−2
(r +
1




S(S − 1) − v2 =
(1− v1)S−1
S − 1
r = v2 +
(1− v1)S−1
S − 1 −
1
S(S − 1) .
We define h(v2, v1) = v2 +
(1−v1)S−1
S−1 − 1S(S−1) . There are values of v2 and v1 that make
h(v2, v1) > 1 or h(v2, v1) < 0 (i.e., v1 = 0 and v2 = 1 or v1 = 1 and v2 = 0). We now
consider the expected profit for each of three cases: when h(v2, v1) > 1, when h(v2, v1) < 0,
and when 0 < h(v2, v1) < 1. We will use h in place of h(v2, v1).
Limits of Integration We first consider the range of values of v1 that correspond to
h(v2, v1) > 1. The upper bound on v1 is derived as follows:
h(v2, v1) > 1
v2 +
(1− v1)S−1
S − 1 −
1
S(S − 1) > 1
v2 +
(1− v1)S−1
S − 1 > 1 +
1
S(S − 1)
v2(S − 1) + (1− v1)S−1 > (S − 1) + S − 1
S(S − 1)
(1− v1)S−1 > (S − 1) + S − 1
S(S − 1) − v2(S − 1)
(1− v1)S−1 > 1
S
+ (1− v2)(S − 1)
(1− v1) > [ 1
S
+ (1− v2)(S − 1)]
1
S−1
v1 < 1− [ 1
S




where Z = 1 − [ 1S + (1 − v2)(S − 1)]
1
S−1 . We now consider the values of v2 for which
v1 < Z is not possible, given that v1 is bounded by [0, 1]. Specifically, when Z ≤ 0, there is
165




+ (1− v2)(S − 1)]
1
S−1 ≤ 0
1 ≤ [ 1
S





+ (1− v2)(S − 1) ≥ 1
(1− v2)(S − 1) ≥ 1− 1
S




(1− v2) ≥ S − 1
S(S − 1)
v2 ≤ 1− 1
S
.
Therefore, when v2 ≤ 1 − 1S there is no v1 for which v1 < Z. So when v2 > 1 − 1S , we
are able to consider the expected profit where h > 1.
We next consider the values of v1 that correspond to h(v2, v1) < 0. If v1 ≥ Z then
h ≤ 1. The lower bound on v1 is derived as follows:
h(v2, v1) < 0
v2 +
(1− v1)S−1
S − 1 −
1
S(S − 1) < 0
(1− v1)S−1
S − 1 <
1
S(S − 1) − v2
(1− v1)S−1 < S − 1
S(S − 1) − v2(S − 1)
(1− v1) < [ 1
S
− v2(S − 1)]
1
S−1
v1 > 1− [ 1
S




where W = 1− [ 1S − v2(S − 1)]
1
S−1 .
We now consider the values of v2 for which v1 > W is not possible, given that v1 is
bounded by [0, 1]. Specifically, when W ≥ 1, there is no value of v1 for which v1 > W or
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− v2(S − 1)]
1
S−1 ≥ 1
0 ≥ [ 1
S





− v2(S − 1) ≤ 0
1
S
≤ v2(S − 1)
1
S(S − 1) ≤ v2
Therefore, when v2 ≥ 1S(S−1) , there is no v1 for which v1 > W . So when v2 < 1S(S−1) we
are able to consider the expected profit when h < 0.






(S − 1)2 − 1
S(S − 1) > 0 when S > 2
Therefore, S−1S >
1
S(S−1) and the ranges on v2 for h < 0 and h > 1 do not intersect.
We also consider the limits of integration when 0 ≤ h ≤ 1. These limits are Z ≤ v1 ≤ W
with the corresponding bounds for v2 as 1S(S−1) ≤ v2 ≤ S−1S .
With these limits of integration, we obtain the expected value of information to the
supplier who knows what her private valuation will be in the last period for the cases when
h(v2, v1) > 1, h(v2, v1) < 0, and 0 < h(v2, v1) < 1.
Case 1: In this case, h(v2, v1) > 1 so the strategic supplier will lose the first auction and
receive her expected profit in the last period. If v2 > S−1S , the expected value of learning














S − 1 +














where the first integrand is the expected profit in the last period and follows from
Proposition 3.4.1 for P1. The third integrand is the expected profit to the supplier when
she does not know v1 until the last period so it is integrated over all possible values of v1.
The second integrand is the expected profit when 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 because although v2 > S−1S ,
it is possible that v1 > Z. When this occurs, the supplier may win in either period. The
integrand is derived as follows:Z 1
h






(x− v1)(S − 2)(1− F (x))S−3f(x)dx














(x− v1)(S − 2)(1− x)S−3dx

(S − 1)(1− v(2))S−2dv(2)
= −

(1− v(2))S−1(v(2) + 1






















































S − 1 +























S − 1 +





























(1− v2 + 1


















S(S − 1) +
−(1− v1)S



















(1− v2 + 1






[(S − 1)(S − i) + 1](S − 1)S−i

,
where the term on line (40) is derived using the integral of the binomial expansion of the





(1− v2 + 1
S(S − 1) +
−(1− v1)S−1










(1− v2 + 1
S(S − 1) )
i(
−(1− v1)S−1
















(1− v2 + 1
S(S − 1) )
i(
−(1− v1)S−1
















(1− v2 + 1
















(1− v2 + 1












Case 2: In this case h(v2, v1) < 0, so the strategic supplier will win the first auction
and receive her expected profit which depends on the bid of the most competitive bidder.
She will not participate in the last period. If v2 < 1S(S−1) , the expected value of learning v1














S − 1 +













The second integrand is for the case when v1 < W which corresponds to 0 < h(v2, v1) < 1
when the supplier could win in either period. The derivation is in (38). The third integrand
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is the expected profit when v1 is not known before the last period. The first integrand is
the expected profit when h < 0 and is derived as follows:Z 1
0





(1− v(2))S−1(v(2) + 1





















S − 1 − v2.














S − 1 +






























(1− v2 + 1


















S(S − 1) +
−(1− v1)S









S − 1 − v2 −
W











(1− v2 + 1






(1−W )(S−1)(S−i)+1 − 1











where the term on line (42) is derived using the integral of the binomial expansion of the





(1− v2 + 1
S(S − 1) +
−(1− v1)S−1










(1− v2 + 1
S(S − 1) )
i(
−(1− v1)S−1
















(1− v2 + 1
S(S − 1) )
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−(1− v1)S−1
















(1− v2 + 1
















(1− v2 + 1













Case 3: In this case 0 < h(v2, v1) < 1, so the strategic supplier has a positive probability
of winning either the first or second auction. If 1S(S−1) ≤ v2 ≤ S−1S , the expected value of






S − 1 +













The first integrand is the expected profit when 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 because although 1S(S−1) ≤
v2 ≤ S−1S , it is possible that Z < v1 < W . When this occurs, the supplier may win in
either period. The derivation of this integrand is given in (38). The second integrand is the
expected profit when v1 is not known before the last period.
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S(S − 1) +
−(1− v1)S

















(1− v2 + 1






















(1− v2 + 1














where the term on line(44) is derived using the integral of the binomial expansion of the
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(1− v2 + 1
S(S − 1) +
−(1− v1)S−1










(1− v2 + 1
S(S − 1) )
i(
−(1− v1)S−1
















(1− v2 + 1
S(S − 1) )
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−(1− v1)S−1
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To determine the amount that a supplier would be willing to pay to learn v1 in the 2nd-
to-last period before v2 is known, (EV IB), we integrate the expected value of information
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We now derive the expected profit to the supplier in the alternating auction when her
private valuation in the last period is fixed but unknown. In equilibrium, the suppliers will
use the optimal bid strategy derived in Proposition 3.4.2 (i.e., b(v2) = v2 + B−32(B+1)(S−1)).
The expected profit to the supplier when her private valuation in the last period v1 is
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(S − 1)(1− v(2))S−2dv(2)
= −
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S − 1 .
We now derive the type that she will bid as for the alternating auction when v1 is known.
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S−2dv(2).
We obtain the first order conditions using Leibnitz’s rule with respect to the type, r, in
the 2nd-to-last period where r is a function of v2 and v1, we have
dP2(v2, v1)
dr
= −[(r + B − 3





S − 1 )(S − 1)(1− r)
S−2 ≡ 0.
We solve for the type r as follows:
(r +
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S − 1 −
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2(B + 1)(S − 1) .
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S−1 − B−32(B+1)(S−1) . There are values of v2 and v1 that
make g(v2, v1) > 1 or g(v2, v1) < 0 (i.e., v1 = 0 and v2 = 1 or v1 = 1 and v2 = 0). We now
consider the expected profit for each of three cases: when g(v2, v1) > 1, when g(v2, v1) < 0,
and when 0 < g(v2, v1) < 1. We will use g in place of g(v2, v1).
Limits of Integration We first consider the range of values of v1 that correspond to
g(v2, v1) > 1. The upper bound on v1 is derived as follows:
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− (1− v2)(S − 1)
v1 < X
where X = 12 − (1− v2)(S − 1). We now consider the values of v2 for which v1 < X is not
possible, given that v1 is bounded by [0, 1]. Specifically, when X ≤ 0, there is no value of




− (1− v2)(S − 1) ≤ 0
1
2
≤ (1− v2)(S − 1)
1
2(S − 1) ≤ 1− v2
v2 ≤ 1− 1
2(S − 1)
Therefore, when v2 ≤ 1− 12(S−1) there is no v1 for which v1 < X. So when v2 > 1− 12(S−1) ,
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we are able to consider the expected profit where g > 1.
We next consider the values of v1 that correspond to g(v2, v1) < 0. If v1 ≥ X then
g ≤ 1. The lower bound on v1 is derived as follows:
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+ v2(S − 1)
v1 > Y
where Y = 12 + v2(S − 1).
We now consider the values of v2 for which v1 > Y is not possible, given that v1 is
bounded by [0, 1]. Specifically, when Y ≥ 1, there is no value of v1 for which v1 > Y or for




+ v2(S − 1) ≥ 1




Therefore, when v2 ≥ 12(S−1) , there is no v1 for which v1 > Y . So when v2 < 12(S−1) we
are able to consider the expected profit when g < 0.
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When we compare the bounds on v2 we have
1− 1
















S − 1 > 0 when S > 2
Therefore, 1− 12(S−1) > 12(S−1) and the bounds on v2 for g < 0 and g > 1 do not intersect.
We also consider the limits of integration when 0 ≤ g ≤ 1. These limits are X ≤ v1 ≤ Y
with the corresponding bounds for v2 as 12(S−1) ≤ v2 ≤ 2S−32(S−1) .
With these limits of integration, we obtain the expected value of information to the
supplier who knows what her private valuation will be in the last period for the cases when
g(v2, v1) > 1, g(v2, v1) < 0, and 0 < g(v2, v1) < 1.
Case 1: In this case, g(v2, v1) > 1 so the strategic supplier will lose the first auction
and have the opportunity to receive an expected profit from initiating a forward auction in
the last period. If v2 > 2S−32(S−1) , the expected value of learning v1 in the 2
nd-to-last period































where the first integrand is the expected profit in the last period and follows from
Proposition 3.4.3 for P1. The third integrand is the expected profit to the supplier when
she does not know v1 until the last period so it is integrated over all possible values of v1.
The second integrand is the expected profit when 0 ≤ g ≤ 1 because although v2 > 2S−32(S−1) ,
it is possible that v1 > X. When this occurs, the supplier may either win as a bidder or
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initiate as an auctioneer. The integrand is derived as follows:Z 1
g
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Case 2: In this case, g(v2, v1) < 0 so the strategic supplier will win the first auction
and not participate in the last period. If v2 < 12(S−1) , the expected value of learning v1 in
































The second integrand is the expected profit when 0 ≤ g ≤ 1 because although v2 <
1
2(S−1) , it is possible that v1 < Y . When this occurs, the supplier may either win as a
bidder or initiate as an auctioneer. The derivation that yields this integrand is given in
(45). The third integrand is the expected profit to the supplier when she does not know v1
until the last period so it is integrated over all possible values of v1. The first integrand is
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the expected profit in the 2nd-to-last period and is derived as follow:Z 1
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Case 3: In this case, 0 < g(v2, v1) < 1, the strategic supplier has a positive probability of
either winning the first auction or initiating the second auction. If 12(S−1) ≤ v2 ≤ 1− 12(S−1) ,























The first integrand is the expected profit when 0 ≤ g ≤ 1 with 12(S−1) ≤ v2 ≤ 1 − 12(S−1) .
In this range, it is possible that 0 ≤ v1 ≤ 1. When this occurs, the supplier may either win
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as a bidder or initiate as an auctioneer. The derivation that yields this integrand is given
in (45).









































































































To determine the amount that a supplier would be willing to pay to learn v1 in the 2nd-
to-last period before v2 is known, (EV IB), we integrate the expected value of information
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We continue after substituting the values of X and Y where where X = 12 − (1−v2)(S−1)
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Von de Fehr, H-H.M. (1994) Predatory Bidding in Sequential Auctions. Oxford Economic
Papers, 46, 345-356.
Waldron, A. (2001) Faculty File: Snapping Waste. Princeton Alumni Weekly,
November 21, 2001,
http://www.princeton.edu/ paw/archive new/PAW01-02/05-1121/notebook.html
Weber, R., (1983) Multiple-object auctions. In: Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Shubik, M.,
Stark, R. (Eds.), Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting, UP, New York, 165-191.
Wu, D. and Kleindorfer, P. (2002) B2B Exchanges and Flexible Supply Chain Contracting.
Working paper, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
193
VITA
Kendra Cherie Taylor was born in Los Angeles, California and raised in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Her parents emphasized the importance of education early in her childhood and enrolled her
in Montessori school at the age of two. Because of their tireless efforts to encourage scholastic
effort and balance, she excelled in academic, sports, artistic and leadership activities.
Her preparation accompanied by God’s grace afforded her a full scholarship to attend
her first choice, Hampton University, a historically Black university in Hampton, Virgina.
The program administering her scholarship had the goal of preparing Kendra to under-
take doctoral studies upon graduation. As a result, she was involved in research activities
throughout her undergraduate career. In 1999, she graduated Summa Cum Laude from
Hampton with a B.S. degree in Mathematics.
Upon completing her undergraduate studies, Kendra had done enough research to de-
termine the area in which she would pursue her Ph.D. and decided to do so at Georgia
Tech. Her experiences at Hampton University confirmed her desire to become an educator,
and hence seek the terminal degree.
During her tenure as a PhD student, Kendra was the recipient of numerous fellowship
awards; including Packard Foundation, Center for Paper Business and Industry Studies,
Student-Teacher Enhancement Partnership, FACES fellowship program, and SREB-AGEP
Doctoral Colloquium. She also coordinated an ISyE women’s breakfast for the female Ph.D.
students in her department.
In 2001, Kendra earned her M.S. degree in Industrial Engineering, and in August, 2005,
earned a Ph.D. in the same field. Kendra has a natural love for teaching, and a strong desire
to become an educator. Accordingly, her post-graduation objective is to pursue a career
in academia after gaining some industry experience. Besides her research and teaching
interests, Kendra also enjoys travel, track and field, and community service.
194
